Archive for 30 junio 2015

PER SALTUM caso Cabral

30 junio, 2015

Demasiados avances del Ejecutivo K se produjeron sin que la Corte Suprema utilice el “per saltum” para defender a la Justicia de los intentos autoritarios de avasallarla.  Ahora sabremos si el Máximo Tribunal argentino se decide a defender a la Constitución cuando el Ejecutivo intenta violarla. La Corte Suprema “kirchnerista” se fue demorando y las consecuencias fueron incertidumbre para todos sobre si Argentina sería una República, o un paraiso bolivariano mas donde el Presidente de turno desacata la Constitución para doblegar a la minoría. Tipo Venezuela.

En los países serios, la Constitución se respeta, y los Presidentes no osan desobedecerla. Nixon renunció por temor a ser citado a juicio político ante las sospechas de haber intervenido en las comunicaciones privadas de los miembros del partido opositor, y Clinton debió responder ante el Senado bajo juramento sobre el caso Levinsky, y como lo negó, el Senado terminó decidiendo que el Presidente continuara en su cargo (aunque muchos sostienen que no dijo toda la verdad, y eso lo ayudó).

Hasta hoy, en Argentina el tema presidencial se ha tratado en forma distinta. En 1930 fue echado por los militares, y ese sistema se repitió varias veces. A Frondizi lo echaron los militares, pero los políticos cerraron los ojos, los militares también, y el presidente provisional del senado fue designado presidente como si nada hubiese ocurrido, y tuvo ocasión de entregar el mando al electo Presidente Illia, que luego fue expulsado. A la viuda de Peron también la echaron, aunque se dice ella quería huir del Poder y de Argentina, cosa que logró luego de cinco años de prisión y hoy vive feliz en España.

Si la actual Corte Suprema se lo propusiera, aplicando el “per saltum” evitará las maniobras presidencialistas para controlar la Justicia. Esta Corte Suprema kirchnerista luego fue cambiando de criterio, quizás fue la influencia favorable del doctor Lorenzetti, y pareciera que hoy nace la posibilidad de sentenciar directamente el Máximo Tribunal argentino en aquellas causas judiciales donde se discute si seremos una Republica Constitucional, o una republiqueta bolivariana desgobernada por el tirano de turno o el populista presidente charlatán que oprime a su pueblo bajo la mentira de defenderlo del imperialismo u otros males.


ARGENTINE UPDATE – Jun 26 & 29, 2015

29 junio, 2015

Countries, Human Rights Abuses in US Report

A woman reacts as she rests from walking back to Tel Abyad town, Raqqa governorate, after fleeing Maskana town in the Aleppo countryside June 16, 2015. With a string of victories over Islamic State, Syria's Kurds are proving themselves an ever more depend
A woman reacts as she rests from walking back to Tel Abyad town, Raqqa governorate, after fleeing Maskana town in the Aleppo countryside June 16, 2015. With a string of victories over Islamic State, 


Middle East
Syria: Massacres by government and allied militias, civilian neighborhoods bombarded, prisoner abuse, rape as a weapon of war; attacks on residential areas; creating some 3.2 million refugees and another 7.6 million internally displaced; widespread torture, forced displacement and starvation; increased human trafficking, child soldiers,; similar abuses by terror groups; 900 members of a single tribe executed by Islamic State; group also stoned women and men accused of adultery, crucified civilians, forced people into marriages, raped kidnapped girls, kept women in sexual slavery, beheaded foreign journalists and aid workers, and circulated videos of their crimes on social media.

Iraq: The Islamic State group killed, raped and recruited child soldiers and targeted Shiites; abuses by Shiite militias operating outside government control, including kidnappings, extortion, killings; limits on freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; violence against journalists; restrictions on religious freedom; widespread corruption. More than 2 million displaced during the year.

Saudi Arabia: Human rights activists tried as terrorist suspects; individual executed for “sorcery;” limited religious freedom; restricted women’s rights; activists sentenced to lashes.

Egypt: Excessive force by security and suppression of liberties; little government investigation of abuses; mass trials; expanded jurisdiction of military courts to try civilians; lengthy pre-trial detentions; thousands of protesters arrested, including secular and Islamist activists.

Israel: Civilians targeted by terrorists; religious motivated “societal violence;” institutional discrimination against Arabs, including self-identified Palestinians and Bedouins; unequal access to education, employment; treatment of refugees and migrants; discrimination against non-Orthodox Jews, minority religions, intermarried families.

Bahrain: Protesters arrested on vague charges, tortured; trials of political and human rights activists, students and journalists without due process, resulting in harsh sentences; discrimination against Shiites.

China: Routine repression of rights advocates, minorities and law firms taking sensitive cases; censorship and tight control of Internet; restrictions on freedom of religion; tens of thousands of political prisoners; prosecution of individuals trying to fight corruption and abuses of power; poor labor standards.

North Korea: A human rights record “among the worst in the world;” systematic violations by government, institutions and officials, including crimes against humanity; public executions, disappearances, arbitrary arrests, torture and severe punishment for refugees returning home; “inhuman” prison camps and forced labor.

Myanmar: Violence and discrimination against Rohingya Muslims; unfair citizenship rules; Muslims displaced by violence, restricted in movements, receiving little help to return to homes; killings, arbitrary detentions and torture by security forces; lack of rule and widespread rape in conflict areas.

Pakistan: Extrajudicial killings; harassment of journalists and high-profile attacks on them; limited freedom of religion for minorities; disappearances, torture and frequent mob and sectarian violence; corruption within police; rape, domestic violence, “honor crimes,” discrimination against women and girls; “widespread” human trafficking, child abuse, sexual exploitation; most of nation not covered by labor rules; human rights abuses go unpunished.

Afghanistan: Widespread atrocities by insurgents, including torture, targeted violence against women and girls; extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and prisoner abuse by security forces; women detained for “moral” crimes, subjected to underage and forced marriages; abuses by officials unprosecuted.

Nigeria: More than 4,000 civilians and tens of thousands displaced by Boko Haram attacks; response hampered by high levels of corruption in Nigeria’s military; impunity for abuses, corruption throughout government; violence against women, sexual exploitation of children; discrimination against women and homosexuals based on ethnicity, religion, region, disabilities; forced and bonded labor.

Sudan: Indiscriminate and deliberate bombing of civilian areas in Darfur; attacks on humanitarian facilities; clashes between government forces, militias, rebels resulting in deaths on all sides; civilian areas shelled by armed opposition, too; opposition, civil society members arrested.

South Sudan: 10,000 children used as fighters in civil war; more than 1.5 people displaced in “one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters’” ethnically targeted killings, rapes by both sides; journalists, political opponents intimidated; U.N. staff and NGOs restricted in movements, harassed; widespread violence against women and children; pervasive corruption, impunity.

Russia: Increasingly authoritarian system; new repressive laws to stop dissent and harass activists, media and other independent voices; in Crimea, members of Tatar community and other religious minorities opposing occupation persecuted; in eastern Ukraine, Russian forces and allied separatists shelled urban areas and committed abductions; widespread corruption throughout all levels of government.

Turkey: Weak justice system, politicized law enforcement, prosecutors suspended for investigating corruption of government officials, evidence destroyed; few prosecutions for excessive force leading to deaths of demonstrators; journalists jailed; individuals vilified for political, religious, cultural views; discrimination against Kurds, Roma, women, children, homosexuals; honor killings, child marriage; poor prison conditions; rise in anti-Semitism among political leaders and pro-government media.

Latin America
Venezuela: Crackdown on protesters, including detentions, torture, imprisonment; opposition figures jailed, media blocked, journalists harassed and intimidated through fines, property seizures, criminal investigations; political opponents prosecuted, harassed, intimidated, imprisoned.






5. ARGENTINA: CURRENCY FORECAST (Economist Intelligence Unit – ViewsWire)
June 25, 2015

BUENOS AIRES, Argentina –  Argentina’s highest criminal court has rejected attempts by the country’s vice president to throw out a bribery case against him.

The Federal Chamber of Criminal Appeals on Thursday confirmed the case against Vice President Amando Boudou. The decision will send Boudou’s case to trial, which would likely be scheduled for next year.

While heading the Economy Ministry in 2010, Boudou allegedly instructed the South American nation’s tax bureau to give the Ciccone printing house an exceptional moratorium to refinance debts amid a bankruptcy.

Boudou has said that he is innocent and that he is being persecuted by political opponents. He has continued in his post, but is not running for any office during the national elections in October.

By James B. Stewart
June 25, 2015

There may be a one-word explanation for why Greece will ultimately capitulate to European demands for more austerity:


Greece is hardly the first nation to face the prospect of defaulting on its sovereign debt obligations. Argentina has defaulted on its external debt no fewer than seven times since gaining independence in 1816, most recently last year. But it’s Argentina’s 2001 default on nearly $100 billion in sovereign debt, the largest at the time, that poses a cautionary example for Greece.

Should Greece default, “Argentina is an apt analogy,” said Arturo C. Porzecanski, a specialist in international finance at American University and author of numerous papers on Argentina’s default. But for Greece, “It would likely be worse. Argentina was comparatively lucky.”

Daniel Gros, director of the Center for European Policy Studies in Brussels and the author of “A Tale of Two Defaults,” a paper comparing Greece and Argentina, agreed. “Default would be much worse for Greece than it was for Argentina,” he said.

Like Greece today, Argentina had endured several years of hardship and austerity by 2001. It borrowed heavily from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United States, all of which demanded unpopular spending cuts. The I.M.F. withheld payments when Argentina (like Greece) failed to meet its deficit targets. A bank run led the government to freeze deposits, which set off riots and street demonstrations. There were deadly confrontations between police and demonstrators in the heart of Buenos Aires, and the president at the time, Fernando de la Rúa, fled the country by helicopter in December. In the last week of 2001, Argentina defaulted on $93 billion in sovereign debt and subsequently sharply devalued the peso, which had been pegged to the dollar.

In addition to social unrest and a wave of political instability (at one point, the country had three presidents in four days), Argentina’s economy plunged into depression. Tens of thousands of the unemployed scavenged the streets collecting cardboard, an enduring image that gave rise to the term “cartoneros.” Dollar-denominated deposits were converted to pesos, wiping out over half their purchasing power.

Despite this trauma, the Argentine economy stabilized in 2002. The country was able to repay the I.M.F. in full by 2006. But the country has never re-entered the international debt markets. It has refused to comply with a ruling by a United States federal court judge that the country must repay in full private creditors who did not participate in the country’s debt restructuring. As a result, Argentina defaulted again last year, and the standoff continues.

Even without much external financing, Argentina’s economy has fared relatively well since 2002, leading some economists, notably Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, to suggest that Greece should default, suffer the short-term pain and follow Argentina’s example.

But even Yanis Varoufakis, Greece’s firebrand finance minister who advocates standing up to the European Union’s demands, said the idea that Greece could default and emulate Argentina was “profoundly wrong,” as he put it in a recent blog post — a point he reiterated when we spoke a few weeks ago.

Argentina’s economic recovery was largely driven by a fortuitously timed surge in commodity exports driven by demand from fast-growing Brazil and China. (Although the commodity boom is long over, and Argentina’s economy today is at best stagnating, those two countries still account for about 28 percent.) Soybean meal, corn and soybean oil are the country’s top three exports. Argentina had a population of over 41 million and gross domestic product of $610 billion in 2013. Although it’s a net importer of energy, it has vast shale oil and gas reserves that could make it self-sufficient.

Greece, by contrast, is heavily dependent on imports. Its top three are crude oil, refined petroleum and pharmaceuticals, all necessities. While its top export is also refined petroleum, it has to import crude oil for its refineries. Its only major homegrown exports are fresh fish and cotton. It would be hard to significantly increase sales of either product: The European Union has strict quotas to prevent overfishing, while cotton production is struggling from reduced demand for textiles and a lack of bank financing.

“Idle productive resources in Greece cannot produce much for which there is increasing demand,” Mr. Varoufakis wrote.

Mr. Gros noted, “Greece doesn’t export much.” If the country left the European Union and brought back a sharply devalued drachma, “They’d gain some from tourism,” he said. “But they’ve already cut prices and tourism has gone up. But it hasn’t really helped because total revenue hasn’t gone up.”

And compared with Argentina, Greece is tiny, with a population of just over 11 million and gross domestic product of $242 billion in 2013. “Argentina is a resource-rich country that, if forced to, can live with its own resources,” Mr. Porzecanski said. “The economic viability of Greece on its own has never been tested” since 1981, when Greece joined the European Union.

Everyone pretty much agrees that, if Greece could devalue its currency, as did Argentina, its economy would benefit. But it was also relatively easy for Argentina to devalue the peso by severing its link to the United States dollar, a tie that was self-imposed. As Mr. Varoufakis put it, Greece doesn’t have a currency that’s pegged to the euro: “It has the euro.” The practical challenge of disseminating a new currency would be enormous. Moreover, Greek savings now denominated in euros (and, in many cases, deposited in European banks outside Greece) can’t be converted to drachmas, as the Argentines converted savings into pesos.

Converting to the drachma would also be a crushing blow to the private sector, much of which finances its activities with euro-denominated loans from non-Greek banks. “They wouldn’t be able to service the debt with devalued drachmas,” Mr. Porzecanski said. Nor would Greek courts have the final say in any ensuing litigation.

In Argentina, “the government ruled that a corporation or bank that owed debts denominated in dollars were payable in pesos at a one-to-one exchange rate,” Mr. Porzecanski said. “They could do that with internal debt. But Greek companies have a lot of cross-border obligations. The European Central Bank has kept Greek banks alive. Its collateral would be worth only a small fraction if Greece leaves the euro. The Greek banks would be insolvent immediately.”

In sum, he said, “It would be a royal mess.”

But as game theorists point out, there’s no guarantee a rational outcome will prevail.

After surging early this week on optimism that Greece had come forward with a workable proposal, markets gyrated on concerns that it still didn’t go far enough to satisfy Greece’s major creditors. And Mr. Varoufakis, while conceding that leaving the euro would be a disaster, still contends a Greek default would be manageable and give Greece more leverage in longer-term negotiations to keep Greece in the European Union and eurozone.

No matter how much worse it might be for Greece than Argentina, “the outcome will ultimately be determined by politics, not economics,” Mr. Gros said. “Economists are terrible at predicting political outcomes.”

Mr. Porzecanski put it another way: “Do the Greek people know they’re playing with fire and might get burnt? It’s what they voted for, and they seem to have voted with their eyes wide open. Not everyone values prosperity the same way” as people in the United States and most of Europe do.

For others, which evidently includes many Greeks, ceding national sovereignty to foreign lenders may be worse than economic chaos. As Mr. Varoufakis wrote, “I salute the Argentinian people for having toppled a regime, and more than one government, that tried so desperately to sacrifice a proud people on the altar of I.M.F.-led austerity.”

People in countries like Venezuela and Cuba have tolerated failed economies and low standards of living for years, and the Russians seem all too willing to follow President Vladimir Putin into recession. “Populism and nationalism,” Mr. Porzecanski said, “are still potent forces.”
By Amanda Billner and Niklas Magnusson
June 25, 2015

The biggest bank in the Baltic region criticized Paul Krugman for comparing Latvia with Argentina at the height of the global financial crisis in 2008.

The Nobel laureate’s predictions failed to take a number of key differences between the two countries into account, including its membership in the European Union and NATO, as well as its debt laws, Swedbank AB Chief Executive Officer Michael Wolf said.

“The analysis was appallingly poor,” Wolf said in an interview in Stockholm earlier this month.

Krugman’s comments in late 2008 did a lot of damage, because they “influenced the whole sentiment,” according to Wolf. He became CEO a few months later, when the Swedish bank was struggling to stem losses brought on by a credit-fueled housing bubble in the former Soviet region.

“Perception can be created by people like Paul Krugman,” Wolf said. “That makes the less informed part of the population make the wrong decisions.”

Krugman didn’t respond to an e-mailed request sent June 24 seeking comment.

In opinion pieces published in the New York Times in December 2008, Krugman said Latvia was the new Argentina, comparing the Baltic nation’s economic crisis with the South American country, which defaulted in 2001.

“The most acute problems are on Europe’s periphery, where many smaller economies are experiencing crises strongly reminiscent of past crises in Latin America and Asia: Latvia is the new Argentina; Ukraine is the new Indonesia,” he wrote.

IMF Bailout
Latvia applied for a bailout from the International Monetary Fund and the EU in 2008 after its second-biggest bank collapsed when its housing bubble burst. The events triggered a recession that culminated in Latvian gross domestic product contracting 14 percent in 2009.

Latvia resisted calls from economists including Nouriel Roubini and Krugman to abandon its currency peg. It opted instead for austerity measures totaling more than 11 percent of GDP in 2009, an unprecedented adjustment in a single year, according to the IMF.

Latvia’s budget cuts during the darkest hours of the financial crisis “saved” its Baltic neighbors, Andrius Kubilius, who was the prime minister of neighboring Lithuania at the time, said in 2010.

Wolf said Swedbank dealt with the panic surrounding the Baltic crisis by publishing stress test results. “At least when we said something, you’d get data that was there for everyone to look at,” he said. “Step by step, we were able to change the picture.”

There’s no question Latvia was in “a very difficult situation,” Wolf said. But its determination to become an integrated member of the EU, and subsequently the euro zone, “is something that you can’t put into Paul Krugman’s models,” he said.

Latvia never defaulted, and has enjoyed seven consecutive quarters of economic growth. Its unemployment rate was 8.6 percent in May, compared with a high of more than 17 percent in March 2010.

It’s not the first time a high-ranking Swede has criticized Krugman. Riksbank Deputy Governor Per Jansson faulted the Nobel laureate for being way off in his characterization of the Swedish central bank as a “sadomonetarist” institution. Krugman has argued the Riksbank’s crisis policies were too tight given the outlook for inflation and unemployment. The Riksbank has responded that the data show a more nuanced picture, given an overheated housing market and strong economic growth.
By Linette Lopez
June 25, 2015

It’s almost silly that we thought it would be so easy.

Argentina watchers hoping that the country would repay its debts and come out of default once Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner left the presidency in 2016 just had their hopes dashed.

Buenos Aires Gov. Daniel Scioli, Fernandez’s chosen successor and frontrunner in this year’s presidential election, lashed out at opposition politicians in a speech on Wednesday.

He nailed them for seeking to pay the “vulture funds,” a group of hedge funds that bought Argentine debt for cents on the dollar after it defaulted in 2001.

The lawsuit that the hedge funds brought — because Argentina’s government refused to pay them — pushed the country into default last year, but no one in the ruling party seems to mind anymore.

“Just a few hours ago, they said that we needed to run out and pay the vulture funds,” Scioli said.

He added that supporting payment would lead to more debt and destruction for the Argentine economy.

So yeah, it doesn’t sound like he wants to pay anyone.

Argentina has been refusing to pay these hedge funds, known collectively as NML, since then. Its intransigence has become an ideological issue for the government; and unfortunately it’s also one that has made Argentina a pariah of international markets and kicked it into default last summer.

Another sign? Scioli chose Fernandez’s legal secretary, Carlos Zannini, as his running mate. Zannini was the brains behind the forced privatization of YPF, an oil company that the country seized from Spanish oil company Repsol in 2012.

Zannini is the man behind Argentina’s attempt to skirt a US Supreme Court’s ruling that it could not pay other bondholders while refusing to pay the “vultures.”

So yeah, he’s not going to pay anyone either.

Last year about this time, Scioli, considered a moderate member of Fernandez’s camp by Argentine standards, was singing a different tune.

“I am confident that a solution can be found and that we can normalize our relationship with the international markets, defending our country, but defending it intelligently,” he said then.

Of course that was right before Argentina missed the payment that sent it into default again.

What it all means is what many Argentines were considering a lost year waiting for Fernandez’s exit, could turn into a lost who-knows-how-long.

Refusing to pay the “vultures” has become a part of the national project, a pillar of party ideology. There’s still a chance that Scioli could lose to an opposition candidate of course. And there’s also the hope that he’ll change course once he’s in office.

But it’s not looking good, people.

Oh, and after Scioli is done with his term, Fernandez can run again. At least that’s the talk in Argentina.

5. ARGENTINA: CURRENCY FORECAST (Economist Intelligence Unit – ViewsWire)
24 June 2015


These forecasts were prepared on March 5, 2015

2011   2012   2013    2014    2015
Ps:US$ (av)                                 4.1     4.5       5.5       8.1      9.5
Nominal appreciation of Ps (%)   -5.2   -9.4   -16.9   -32.4   -15.2
Real appreciation of Ps (%)      14.9    10.8     -2.5     -9.6      5.5
Ps:US$ (end period)                   4.3       4.9     6.5       8.5   10.9

2011   2012   2013    2014   2015
Ps:€ (av)                                       5.7     5.8      7.3     10. 7    10.2
Nominal appreciation of Ps (%)   -9.6    -1.9   -19.6   -32.4       4.9
Real appreciation of Ps (%)          9.5    19.9     -4.2    -7.4      34.0
Ps:€ (end period)                5.5    6.5    9.0     10.3    10.7

2011    2012    2013    2014    2015
Ps:¥100 (av)                                  3.8       4.2       5.2       7.7       9.2
Nominal appreciation of Ps (%)  -11.1    -10.4   -18.1    -33.0    -16.0
Real appreciation of Ps (%)        10.7      12.0     -1.8      -8.6       6.2
Ps:¥100 (end period)                    3.9        4.6       6.2       8.1     10.5

2011   2012   2013   2014   2015
Real effective exchange rate (1997=100)   51.1   48.8      50.0   49.8     49.1

2014                      2015
Nov    Dec    Jan    Feb    Mar    Apr
Ps:US$ (av)   8.46   8.51   8.56   8.64   8.74   8.82


Persistent pressure on the black-market exchange rate highlights the large and growing risks to our benign baseline assumption that the process of peso adjustment will be managed without provoking an abrupt, uncontrolled devaluation.

The peso remained stable in the immediate aftermath of Argentina’s default on July 30th, based partly on the assumption that Argentina would come to a relatively quick agreement with the holdouts and exit default once the Rufo clause expires at the end of 2014. However, subsequent signs that the government is in fact in no hurry to come to an agreement with holdouts (as evidenced by its decision to press forward with a swap of exchange bonds to evade its troublesome US court ruling), combined with local data showing an increased fiscal deficit and a pick-up in inflation have heightened market nervousness and produced renewed devaluation pressure.

Direct intervention in the foreign-exchange market limited the weakening of the peso in the official market to 5% between late August and late September, but the value of the black-market rate has fallen much more substantially, producing a black-market premium that is now approaching 90%. Our benign baseline forecast assumes that after depreciating by close to 35% in 2014, continued adjustment under the heavily managed float will involve a still-substantial depreciation of around 20% per year in 2015-16 and around 10% per year in 2017-19.

This would reverse the accumulated real appreciation of the peso in the past five years that has eroded export competitiveness, and bring the real trade-weighted exchange rate back to around 2008 levels. However, in light of continued uncertainty over the direction of policy in the remainder of the Fernández government’s term, we continue to believe that there are substantial risks to our forecast, and a strong chance of a steep, uncontrolled devaluation at some point in the forecast period.


2011    2012    2013    2014    2015
¥:US$ (av)   79.7         79.8         97.6       105.9        121.7
US$:€ (av)   1.39         1.29        1.33         1.33          1.07
¥:€ (av)      110.9       102.6      129.6       140.7        130.7
By Charles Newbery
24 June 2015

Neuquen, Argentina (Platts)–24Jun2015/820 pm EDT/020 GMT

* Drilling costs must come down to attract capital
* Limited acreage still available, so partnerships good for new entrants
* But license law change means no rush to bring partners on board

The dozen or so companies with acreage in Vaca Muerta, the biggest shale play in Argentina, will need more foreign capital to shift into development after pilot testing, an industry leader said Wednesday.

“We need more companies and more investment,” said Alberto Saggese, president of Gas y Petroleo del Neuquen (GyP), the state oil company of the southwestern province of Neuquen, home to most of Vaca Muerta.

State-run YPF was the first to put the play into mass production in a partnership with Chevron. They are producing 43,000 b/d of oil equivalent, mostly of light crude.

Of the other players with acreage in the play, four have recently entered pilot production, led separately by ExxonMobil, Shell, Total and Wintershall.

“If the pilots work and they have to do mass development, they are going to have to find partners,” Saggese said on the sidelines of the World Shale Oil & Gas Latin America Summit in Neuquen City. “It is too much money for any of them to go it alone.”

Most estimates suggest that between $5 billion and $12 billion a year must be invested to put Vaca Muerta into mass production, helping to turn around a 20% decline in national oil and gas production over the past decade that has led to shortages and a rise in imports.

However, Saggese said that for foreign companies to bet on Vaca Muerta, drilling costs must come down to attract capital at a time when low global oil prices are shrinking investment budgets.

The goal is to reach the cost levels of $4 million-$5 million/well seen in shale plays in the US, Saggese said.

YPF is drilling vertical wells at $7 million/well, down from $11 million in 2013.

To continue cutting costs, what is needed most is foreign capital to ramp up drilling and improve operational efficiency with new technology and techniques like slim-hole drilling, Saggese said.

YPF has gone out to look for partners, entering joint ventures with Chevron and Malaysia’s state-owned Petronas for Vaca Muerta, and Dow Chemical for a tight-gas development in another play. Gazprom has expressed interest in partnering with YPF, while Canada’s Madalena Energy, Shell and others have announced plans to look for partners in Vaca Muerta.

Saggese said such partnerships are one of the few remaining entry points for new players in Vaca Muerta.

“There is little acreage still available, and it is marginal,” he said. “The acreage still available is in the foothills [of the Andes mountains] and the dry gas window.”

Of Vaca Muerta’s total acreage, YPF has a 36% share, followed by GyP with 11%, Wintershall and Total each with 6%, YPF’s Y-SUR unit with 5% and Petrobras. Andes Energia, ExxonMobil, Pluspetrol and a few other companies hold smaller percentages.

Saggese said he doesn’t expect companies to rush out in search of partners.

This is because a reform of the national hydrocarbon law last year means that the companies have 35-year concessions for their acreage. So whereas before the reform, companies would have to demonstrate their exploration and production advances on the blocks as a requirement of their licenses, now the threat of invest or lose the license is no longer there, he added.

¿continuidad? ¿cambio?

28 junio, 2015

ARGENTINE UPDATE – Jun 24 & 25, 2015

27 junio, 2015

Menem, Jorge Avila y químicos necesitamos

25 junio, 2015

ARGENTINA SALVAJIZADA el maestro Jorge Avila parece el mas sensato profesor de economía  en Argentino pero los peronistas lo rechazan porque es de los pocos que coinciden en que sin moneda, Argentina y cualquier pais son ingobernables. Curiosamente, su curriculum indica que se recibió de QUIMICO – como Jorge Bergoblio, hoy Francisco – aunque hizo un post grado en USA en economía. ¿Necesitamos mas químicos y menos economistas y políticos para que Argentina no vuelva a explotar por razones monetarias?

Ver la entrada original


25 junio, 2015




          He tenido el placer de escuchar una sencilla y sensata lección  de política y economía impartida por Jorge Avila, economista del CEMA, a Héctor Timerman, como anfitrión en su programa televisivo por cable.

         Me hubiera gustado que la vieran aquellos que suponen que López Murphy es MAS liberal que Carlos Menem, porque ignoran lo que es ser un liberal popular y suponen que los neoliberales verticalistas dirigistas del Estáblishment son liberales cuando son meros conservadores SOCIALISTAS DE DERECHA, que quieren controlar la ECONOMÍA DESDE SU MALDITO MINISTERIO, el mas costoso, corrupto e inútil de todos desde hace décadas…

        Jorge Avila explicó magistralmente – con pocas y sensatas palabras, como utilizan los que saben – que Menem POLÍTICAMENTE es un liberal real, tal como lo demostró en la cancha, donde ni persiguió a sus adversarios…

Ver la entrada original 738 palabras más

ARBITROS ingleses en el futbol argentino

25 junio, 2015
Lunes 6 de octubre de 2014 | 08:36

De árbitros ingleses en Argentina…

Raúl Mario Herrera

A mediados de los años ’40, el referato argentino estaba muy mal considerado; los mismos favorecían a los equipos grandes y a los locales. En realidad, esto ya venía ocurriendo desde la última etapa del Amateurismo. Se hablaba también de soborno y arreglos, esto desencadenó varios hechos violentos; en uno de ellos, en 1946, Osvaldo Cossio se salvó por un pelo de que lo lincharan en un partido entre Newell’s y San Lorenzo. Tan es así que la AFA, a partir de 1948 decidió contratar a un grupo de referís ingleses para que impartieran justicia en nuestro fútbol.

Los árbitros ingleses contratados posan en la sede de la AFA. Parados: Dean, Gibbs y Hartles; sentados: Provan, Gregory, White, Cox y Brown.

El 18 de abril de 1948, se produjo el debut de los árbitros británicos. Aubrey White, dirigió el partido Independiente 10, Rosario Central 2; James Provan, Boca Juniors 1, Racing 4; William Brown, Tigre 1, River Plate 4; Leonel Gibbs, Newell’s 3, Vélez Sarsfield 1; Calden Dean, Estudiantes 2, Lanús 1; Harry Hartles, San Lorenzo 0, Huracán 1; Davis Gregory, Banfield 4 Gimnasia y Esgrima L. P. 2 y John Cox, Platense 3, Chacarita 2.

Cuenta Pablo Ramírez en su libro, “Fútbol: Historia del Profesionalismo”, “Fue evidente que los árbitros restablecieron la paridad entre equipos grandes y chicos, cosa que no ocurría con los jueces locales, inevitablemente sujetos a las presiones de toda índole que siempre los ha volcado insensiblemente en favor de los más poderosos…”.

Gracias a un pedido de ellos produjeron un cambio histórico en el fútbol vernáculo. A partir de la novena fecha del campeonato de primera “A” de 1949 los jugadores comenzaron a utilizar camisetas con números en sus espaldas con el fin de ser mejor identificados.

Leonel Gibbs, árbitro británico que dirigió durante la temporada de 1948 y regresó a su país por cuestiones familiares.

Transcurrieron los años, y esta camada de jueces fue suplantada por otra, que fueron intercalando con referís “criollos”. En 1958 finalizaron sus contratos. El último británico que dirigió aquí fue Robert Turner, quien se radicó en la Argentina y actuó hasta 1962, por haber llegado al límite de edad.

Entre 1958 y 1959, también dirigió en nuestro país, Edwin Hieger, austríaco, nacionalizado peruano.


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