Archive for 31 julio 2014

CRISTINA “NO DEFAULTEA”

31 julio, 2014

SALIR DEL DEFAULT bis

31 julio, 2014

SALIR DEL DEFAULT  desde aquí escribimos el 16 de abril de 2010, cuando Néstor vivía, y Cristina Presidente lo prometía. Pero ella enviudó, dilapidó el dinero Estatal para ser reelecta, se olvidó de los acreedores o le surgió resentimiento anti-yanqui, y no cumplió con el pago a los litigantes ante el Juez Griesa. Que Dios y la Patria la perdonen ( aunque según el Papa Francisco la corrupción es no tiene perdón, porque quien lo comete no tiene propósito de enmienda).

Y Ella ha mostrado incapacidad administrativa e imprudencia. Insultar al Juez Griesa no fue acertado, demostró insensatez populista , pero la Constitución – que ella violó al no dejar el manejo de la deuda externa en manos del Congreso –  obliga a que siga en su puesto hasta diciembre 10 de 2015, Pero ya el mundo sabe hoy que estamos desgobernados asta que termine su mandato. O que se decida a renunciar para que otro Presidente, que surja de una elección anticipada, cumpla con la sencilla tarea de salir del default, para bien de acreedores, deudores y el conjunto de los argentinos.

Cuanto antes llegue el fin de su mandato presidencial, mas rápido volverá  la confianza que Argentina necesitamos. Lo ideal sería que  se vaya cuanto antes,  como el ex Presidente Cámpora y su vice Solano Lima, para posibilitar que constitucionalmente Perón volviese a la Presidencia. Si Cristina advirtiese que los argentinos mayoritariamente no admiramos al modelo cubano y que cuando nuestra juventud quiere emigrar prefiere los Estados Unidos, comprendería que se equivocó demasiado: no somos mayoritariamente comunistas ni bolivarianos venezolanos. La Constitución que tenemos es un modelo sensato y viable, siempre que tengamos un Presidente honesto. ¿Es imprescindible Cristina Presidenta hasta el fin de su mandato, habiendo mostrado su verdadera capacidad, y reinventado la inflación y las sospechas de haberse enriquecido demasiado desde el Poder?

 

Lo que nos ocultan desde 2002

28 julio, 2014

lo que los K y anteriores nos ocultaron…

Si aceptamos que sucedió UN ROBO LEGALIZADO cuando Duhalde se apropió de los dólares ajenos que constituían dinero ajeno, de propiedad de los tenedores de cada peso convertible, todos los funcionarios públicos desde el 1 de enero de 2002 serían – por acción u omisión – responsables de una estafa argentina de alrededor de 16.ooo.ooo.ooo,oo (16 mil millones de dolares o su equivalente en inglés 16 billion dolars)

Esto explica porqué a Argentina se la considera incumplidora serial, y porqué nos desprestigiamos, ya que el Congreso Norteamericano fué expresamente informado por Steve H. Hanke en un sworn affidavit, donde aconsejaba no prestar mas dinero a semejante país. Y la Unión Norteamericana tomó nota, y también se enteró el Juez Griesa, supongo. ¿Porqué nos engañaron nuestros gobernantes Duhalde, Nestor y Kristina Kirchner? ¿ Porqué los Presidentes del Banco Central, que fueron varios, incluso hoy, también callaron? ¿Porqué los economistas omitieron éste dato, cuando opinan sobre cómo lograr que Argentina sea un país creible para su propia población?

La Ley de Convertibilidad ordenaba que el Banco Central actuara como Fideicomisario, custodiando un dólar cash por cada peso convertible que emitiría, para garantizar a todos que siempre habría un dólar norteamericano en poder del Banco Central para rescatar hasta el último peso convertible. El mecanismo  diseñado por Steve H. Hanke y Kurt Schuler, era sencillo. Pero algo falló, quizás por error o por fraude, que habría que investigar cuanto antes, y si interviene de oficio el fiscal Campagnoli mejor: olvidaron en el Balance Anual del Banco Central modificar un tema importante: las reservas ajenas o dólares que pasaban a ser custodiadas por dicho banco como Fideicomisario, no eran del Estado Argentino. Esto surgía del articulado de la ley de Convertibilidad, donde decía que el Estado debía adecuar la contabilidad para reflejar el interesante cambio operado, que garantizaba que el peso convertible siempre valdría un dólar. Igual que en las partidas de poker, donde cada ficha tiene siempre el respaldo del dinero que representa, y solo cuando el cajero defraudó el mecanismo, se pudo producir un faltante.  Quizás Duhalde lo sabía, pero quería engañar al mundo haciendo creer que el Banco Central tenía mas reservas que las reales, pero lo dudo, por algo concreto: jamás, desde que comenzó la convertibilidad, el Banco Central contabilizó las reservas de la convertibilidad como dinero ajeno, y recordemos que este error duró desde 1991 hasta el 1 de enero de 2002, cuando la convertibilidad fue abolida (y el Central legalizó el robo de las reservas ajenas, al no modificar el error inicial). Ergo, de Duhalde podríamos decir que nunca se enteró, o todo lo contrario. Como ningún Presidente o Director del Banco Central denunció penalmente que habían sido estafados los cándidos detentadores de pesos convertibles, cuando se les quitó la garantía de un dólar físico custodiado por el Bco. Central, pareciera que todos ellos fueron bandidos. O lo ignoraron…

El problema es que mientras no se investigue para atrás, Argentina seguirá siempre con la mancha de haber robado a tenedores abstractos de 16 mil palos verdes las reservas, y eso motivó el hundimiento económico argentino del 2002:  quienes tenían un billete de un peso convertible perdieron el respaldo dolar y en ocho meses desde enero 1 a agosto de 2002 el valor del peso argentino ya  NO convertible perdió cuatro veces de valor, subiendo a cuatro pesos por dolar. Esto es inflación del 300% en 8 meses, una hiperinflación real que nos aumentó el caos. Y forzó que Duhalde cambiara sus planes de quedarse dos años enteros hasta cumplir el trunco mandato de Fernando de la Rúa (para ese sucio golpe de Estado, el Congreso cambió la ley de Acefalía la triste noche de año nuevo entre 2001 y 2002, a espaldas del pueblo, pero con apoyo del hiperinflacionario entonces senador Raúl Alfonsín.

El desprecio de Alfonsín y Duhalde por las instituciones políticas quedó oculto, nadie investigó para qué se hizo el desastre. La sospecha estriba en que el peronismo duro duhaldista quería devaluar, ese había sido el caballito de batalla de Duhalde cuando compitió contra de la Rúa para la Presidencia, como sucesor de Carlos Menem. Mas la enorme mayoría de la gente argentina prefería mantener la convertibilidad, en proporción de nueve contra uno, decían encuestas. Al no ser electo Presidente, Duhalde logró dos años después por medio no constitucional lograr el cargo Presidencial que los argentinos le negamos al votar a Fernando de la Rúa. Los analistas políticos callan, los políticos también y los Fiscales no investigan el Golpe de Estado, que fue traición a la Patria o algo parecido, porque un Presidente (bandido u honesto, nunca sabremos) fue expulsado en helicóptero para que finalmente su vencido en las urnas dos años antes ocupara su puesto, y desde allí usase el dinero de Argentina para lograr que Nestor Kirchner lo sucediera como Presidente.

Los Kirchners ya no son creíbles, pero tampoco lo fueron Duhalde, de la Rúa y otros. Argentina seguirá teniendo mala prensa, porqué nuestros gobernantes desgobernaron y lograron impunidad. Y un país impune termina degradándose, al punto que hoy Jorge La Nata es mas creíble que la Presidenta Cristina, pero nadie logra que las investigaciones penales contra ella avancen, porque hemos perdido el ESTADO DE DERECHO. Hay que denunciar e investigar LA ESTAFA LEGALIZADA porque sin ello, los políticos nos seguirán engañando. Y Argentina sin moneda confiable no será en corto tiempo un país civilizado para vivir tranquilos. Cuando la palabra oficial del país, la del Presidente, no es creída porque la opinión pública siente que desde el Gobierno nos roban y engañan, la decadencia ha llegado, y un cambio debe producirse, porque Argentina seguirá existiendo y los habitantes también, solo que mas embrutecidos a menos que cambie el Gobierno y la Constitución se respete. Por suerte, la nada creíble y su menos creíble vice presidente termina su mandato el 10 de diciembre del 2015, pero si ambos renunciasen hoy y se adelantaran las elecciones, sería mejor para todos: con Cristina Presidenta, el Estado no es seguro, sino un factor de atraso rápido. Golpe de Estado no sirve, recordemos que a de la Rúa le sucedió alguien peor, Duhalde, y éste puso a Néstor de Presidente, y luego…sólo quedó Cristina, la exitosa abogada que enriqueció demasiado.

Por desgracia, son demasiados los políticos involucrados en los desmanejos y estafas, ya que Argentina somos país fascista populista desde que Perón como militar exitoso logró ser electo Presidente en elecciones limpias en 1946. Su mito de benefactor de los pobres perdura, los políticos creen que es mejor ser enemigo de los Estados Unidos y los paises occidentales de vanguardia, y eso no sirve: en el progreso evolutivo, Argentina desde Sarmiento a hoy, hemos perdido tiempo y puestos. Nuestros paises vecinos están mejor, porque nuestro populismo es mucho mas mentiroso y profundo que en el resto de Sudamérica, exceptuando a Venezuela, quizás. ¿Entenderá la Presidenta que su modelo ha fracasado? Ojo, aguantarla hasta terminar su mandato es duro, pero un golpe de Estado sería peor. Lástima que parecieran los gobernantes que siguen engañando y robando hasta el último momento. Por eso, una renuncia anticipada sería conveniente, y hasta Ella se beneficiaría, porque cometería el Estado Argentino menos errores y gastos. Hacerse llevar los diarios a Santa Cruz en el Tango 003 la Presidenta es señal de  insensatez y capricho de alguien que se cree dueña del país. Y quien lo hace, demuestra exactamente cuanto respeta las finanzas del Estado y nos muestra cuan poco  le interesa bajar los gastos públicos para que Argentina pueda recuperarse económica y moralmente.

UN ROBO LEGALIZADO

28 julio, 2014

ARGENTINA SALVAJIZADA

CHARLA 222ª DEL CURSILLO DE ECONOMÍA CRIOLLA – 05-03-02


UN ROBO “LEGALIZADO”

(POR STEVE H.  HANKE)

NOTA: es importante destacar que el autor denuncia el ROBO de las reservas de la convertibilidad, que son propiedad legal de los tenedores de los pesos converitibles, por parte del ESTADO LADRON. A esta altura, y dado el alto prestigio del autor, ya en todo el mundo civilizado se sabe lo que esta sucediendo en Argentina, y cabe suponer que el Gobierno Norteamericano lo tendra muy en cuenta al momento de escuchar los “planes sustentables”  que el Presidente Duhalde viene “amenazando”  con presentar. De esta maniobra ilegal advertimos a nuestros visitantes con fecha veinte de enero,  en nuestra Charla 176ª titulada DEMANDAR AL BANCO CENTRAL Y AL ESTADO, sugiriendoles consultar con sus abogados para iniciar distintas acciones legales incluyendo un “interdicto de recuperar” (recobrar) contra el Banco Central, anunciando que dias despues lo iniciariamos…

Ver la entrada original 1.212 palabras más

ARGENTINE UPDATE – Jul 25, 2014

28 julio, 2014
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. WALL STREET TAKES A SHINE TO ARGENTINE BONDS (The Wall Street Journal)
By Matt Wirz
25 July 2014
Argentina hasn’t made many friends on Wall Street. But that hasn’t stopped bankers from trying to bring the country back into the bond market.
The largest financial firms spent much of the first part of 2014 devising an escape route for Argentina from a legal standoff with some hedge-fund bondholders that threatens to throw the nation into default for the second time in 13 years.
A handful of large banks pitched bond sales that would have paved the way for a settlement with so-called holdout creditors led by Elliott Management Corp. The proposals didn’t win the approval of Argentine officials, and it isn’t even clear how seriously they were considered, given the yawning gap between the Argentine and hedge-fund negotiating positions and the limited popularity of global financial firms in Argentina.
Even so, the effort could still be a success for Wall Street if Argentina reaches a settlement and starts issuing bonds again. Investors and bankers say firms were seeking foremost to drum up new business.
“A lot of banks are actively pitching deals to Argentina,” said Tony Volpon, head of emerging-markets research at Nomura Securities. “Argentina was Wall Street’s best client for 10 years, and a lot of people think that may come back.”
Wall Street efforts underscore the lucrative fees the banks stand to win at a time when revenue is under pressure from soft economic growth, tighter rules and hefty regulatory scrutiny. Argentina issued $56 billion of bonds between 1995 and 2001, generating an estimated $720 million for the banks that sold the debt, according to Dealogic.
The pitches have been fueled in part by strong demand from investment funds that focus on distressed debt. The push also undercuts the market assumption that defaulting debtors become international pariahs that can’t be rehabilitated.
If a new bond sale comes together, “there will be many, many people interested and we will be one of them, depending on the price,” says Redwood Capital Management LLC founder Jonathan Kolatch.
Bank of America Corp., Goldman Sachs Group Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and UBS AG each pitched Argentine officials this year on a potential bond sale, according to people familiar with the proposals.
Argentine officials ended the discussions with the banks in June, after a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that the country’s lawyers say puts the nation at risk of breaching a clause in its bonds that promises equal treatment to all bondholders, the people familiar with the proposals said.
At least one of the banks then pushed Elliott, the lead holdout creditor, to consider an agreement under which Argentina would indemnify the holdouts for legal costs estimated to exceed $100 million, the people said. The gesture would allow Argentina to offer some financial compensation without violating the equal-treatment clause, they said.
For now, no sale or other arrangement appears imminent. Argentine officials have refused to meet with the holdouts, and if the two sides can’t reach a settlement, the country will default on a more than $800 million bond payment due July 30.
Argentina has declined to negotiate with the holdouts for more than a decade, calling them vultures who refused to accept the restructurings that more than 90% of bondholders have agreed to already. More recently, Argentine officials have said they can’t negotiate because of the equal-treatment clause, known as Right Upon Future Offers.
The clause, written into more than $54 billion of bonds Argentina issued in restructurings during the 2000s, requires any deal struck with holdouts before the end of 2014 to be offered to those who took losses in the prior exchanges.
Investors and bankers say a new bond could facilitate a settlement much like the roughly $5 billion deal the country reached earlier this year with Spanish oil company Repsol SA. Argentina would issue the bond to the holdouts, led by Elliott, which would immediately resell it to other hedge funds through an investment bank, the people familiar with the proposal say.
Argentina faces potential claims of $14.5 billion from bondholders such as Elliott. Repayment in full is unlikely, analysts said, but the country could at some point need to raise billions of dollars through bonds to repay the holdouts.
U.S. hedge funds have piled into Argentine bonds in recent years, betting the economy will flourish and bond prices will rise after President Cristina Kirchner is replaced in elections next year. The funds include Fortress Investment Group LLC, Hayman Capital Management LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Perry Capital, Redwood Capital, Silver Point Capital and Third Point LLC.
Much like Greece in 2011, and Puerto Rico in 2013, Argentina has become a favorite trade for so-called vulture funds because it is one of the few borrowers with large amounts of debt trading at deep discounts. The sovereign’s benchmark bond due 2033 traded around 65 cents on the dollar in January and has since risen to about 89 cents, according to Tradeweb.
Many of the hedge funds now investing in Argentina also bought Puerto Rico bonds last year and bankrolled a new bond sale for the cash-strapped island in March to help bolster its finances. Perry Capital bought $120 million of that bond and Silver Point bought $70 million.
2. ARGENTINA REPORTS CONTINUING ECONOMIC WEAKNESS IN MAY; MAY GDP PROXY DOWN 0.2% ON YEAR, UP 0.5% ON MONTH (The Wall Street Journal Online)
By Shane Romig
24 July 2014
BUENOS AIRES—Argentina’s gross domestic product proxy for May dipped slightly on the year but edged higher on the month as the economy continued to be mired in recession.
In May, the indicator fell 0.2% on the year, but climbed 0.5% on the month, the national statistics agency Indec reported Thursday.
The indicator, known by its Spanish acronym Emae, includes most of the components used to calculate quarterly GDP.
Argentina’s economy slid into recession this year due to weak growth in top trade partner Brazil, double-digit inflation that has hit consumer spending and foreign-currency shortages that make it harder for companies to import materials and equipment.
A 20% devaluation of the peso against the U.S. dollar in January and increasing benchmark interest rates to almost 30% has also slowed growth, though those measures were successful in stopping a run on the central bank’s depleted foreign-currency reserves.
GDP contracted 0.8% during the three month period ending March 31, marking the second consecutive quarter-on-quarter contraction in the economy. GDP shrank 0.5% in the fourth quarter of last year.
Alberto Messer contributed to this article
3. RULINGS ADD TO THE MESS IN ARGENTINE BONDS (NYTimes.com Feed)
By Floyd Norris
25 July 2014
Thomas Poole Griesa has been a federal judge for 42 years. He has been grappling with Argentina’s debt default for a decade.
Only now is he learning how complicated life can be for a judge seeking to control actions by a sovereign government and issuing orders that are supposed to be binding on those who would ordinarily never be within the jurisdiction of an American court.
“We are in the soup,” he said at one point on Tuesday during the latest hearing in a case that has shaken the world of sovereign debt restructuring.
He was referring to the prospect of a new Argentine default on its sovereign bonds, something that seems almost certain to happen on Wednesday. But he could have been referring to the process he unleashed with rulings that were meant to accomplish one thing — force Argentina to live up to what he repeatedly called its “obligations” — but failed to take into account just how complex the situation is. This week’s hearing made clear that he had not completely understood the bond transactions that he had been ruling on for years. Argentina defaulted on its debt in 2001 and took an imperial attitude toward aggrieved creditors. In 2005, it offered a take-it-or-leave-it exchange of new bonds for the old ones, with investors required to accept large losses. Then in 2010 it told investors who had held out that they would have one more chance to take the exchange bonds. The vast majority did, but some, largely hedge funds, did not and demanded full repayment. Argentina vowed that those investors who refused would never receive a dime.
Then came Judge Griesa, who was chief judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York until 2000, when he became a senior judge.
Other judges had ruled that Argentina owed the money, but those rulings were, in practice, unenforceable against a sovereign state. Judge Griesa came up with a legal interpretation to put teeth in the rulings. He held that Argentina must pay the old bonds in full at the same time it made the next semiannual interest payment to holders of the new bonds. And if it did not do so, any bank that helped Argentina pay interest on the new bonds would be violating the order.
That ruling was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and in June the Supreme Court refused to hear Argentina’s final appeal.
In Argentina’s debt restructuring, holders of the old bonds who accepted the country’s offer received a variety of new bonds depending to some extent on which old bonds they held and to some extent on which new bonds they chose. Some of the exchange bonds were denominated in United States dollars, some in Argentine pesos, some in euros and some in Japanese yen. Some of them were subject to New York law, others to Argentine, English or Japanese law.
And that is where the complexities arose that Judge Griesa seems not to have understood.
The order he issued earlier this year said that — assuming Argentina does not make good on the old bonds — it should not make interest payments on the exchange bonds, and banks should not help it do so. That sounded as if it covered all the exchange bonds, even those not issued under New York law.
But the opinion explaining the order discussed only the dollar bonds issued under New York law. It ignored the existence of other exchange bonds.
So did the ruling apply to those other exchange bonds, including those issued under Argentine law? Would a bank that processed interest payments on those bonds be in trouble with the judge?
Citibank’s Argentine branch, which is the trustee for bonds issued under Argentine law, some denominated in pesos and some in dollars, asked the judge for a clarification, and on June 27 he provided one. Citibank could process interest payments on those bonds. They were not covered by his order.
This week’s hearing was largely about changing that ruling, and the judge initially made it clear that he saw no reason for a change. He saw the bonds as domestic ones, owned by Argentine citizens. “From a practical, common-sense standpoint,” he asked a lawyer for the hedge funds who was trying to have the order modified, “why do they have to get dragged into this?”
It turned out that he did not know much about those Argentine-law bonds. He said his June order provided “a rather minute exception” to his original ruling, and told the hedge funds’ lawyer, Edward A. Friedman of Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman, “It is my understanding that the bonds being talked about in your motion are not part of the exchange.”
Told that the bonds in question were exchange bonds, and that they accounted for nearly a quarter of all the exchange bonds, he said he had not realized that and reversed course.
“Sitting here right now,” he said, “it strikes me that, being exchange bonds, they should be treated as exchange bonds and that they should be included with the other exchange bonds in the Feb. 23 order.”
It was not bad theater, but it hardly inspired confidence in the American legal system.
“These questions are essential to the operation of this injunction,” Anna Gelpern, a law professor at Georgetown University who has followed the case for years, said after reading the transcript of Tuesday’s hearing. “Up to half the debt could be in or out depending on how these questions are resolved. The fact we are confronting them, days before a payment default, is scary.”
It is not as if no one had pointed out the issues in the many legal briefs and arguments filed in this case, both before Judge Griesa and before appeals courts. But those arguments seem not to have registered. “For this to come out after this has gone through so much legal process, in the most sophisticated financial jurisdiction in America,” Ms. Gelpern said, “has to be astounding.”
On Tuesday, Judge Griesa eventually decided he would think it over and rule at a later date. At some point he will also have to deal with the status of bonds issued under English or Japanese law.
If he ends up ruling that the Argentine-law bonds are covered by his original ruling, and tells Citibank not to process the interest payment, then Citibank could have to decide whether to defy him or ignore the law in Argentina, where it could face prosecution.
If he rules the other way, Argentina may try to find a way to do a new exchange, with Argentine-law bonds given to any investors who want to give up their bonds issued under United States law. The judge would probably try to block such an exchange.
A grace period gives Argentina until Wednesday to pay the interest it owes on the exchange bonds. It has paid the money to the bank trustees, including Bank of New York Mellon for the New York-law bonds. That bank has done nothing with the money because it is clearly bound by the judge’s order.
Argentina says that payment means it will not default, because it will not be the country’s fault if the exchange bond holders are not paid. The judge says Argentina acted illegally in making the payment, but he has not decided what Bank of New York Mellon should do now. The hedge funds want the judge to order the bank to return the money to Argentina. The bank, fearing suits from bondholders, wants to keep the money until all this is sorted out. The judge is also pondering that issue.
As Wednesday approaches, the judge has a lot to think about. It would be better if he had done some of that thinking before he issued his order, or if the appeals court or the Supreme Court had forced him to do so.
4. THE MUDDLED CASE OF ARGENTINE BONDS (The New York Times)
July 24, 2014
Thomas Poole Griesa has been a federal judge for 42 years. He has been grappling with Argentina’s debt default for a decade.
Only now is he learning how complicated life can be for a judge seeking to control actions by a sovereign government and issuing orders that are supposed to be binding on those who would ordinarily never be within the jurisdiction of an American court.
“We are in the soup,” he said at one point on Tuesday during the latest hearing in a case that has shaken the world of sovereign debt restructuring.
He was referring to the prospect of a new Argentine default on its sovereign bonds, something that seems almost certain to happen on Wednesday. But he could have been referring to the process he unleashed with rulings that were meant to accomplish one thing — force Argentina to live up to what he repeatedly called its “obligations” — but failed to take into account just how complex the situation is. This week’s hearing made clear that he had not completely understood the bond transactions that he had been ruling on for years.
Argentina defaulted on its debt in 2001 and took an imperial attitude toward aggrieved creditors. In 2005, it offered a take-it-or-leave-it exchange of new bonds for the old ones, with investors required to accept large losses. Then in 2010 it told investors who had held out that they would have one more chance to take the exchange bonds. Most did, but some, largely hedge funds, did not and demanded full repayment. Argentina vowed that those investors who refused would never receive a dime.
Then came Judge Griesa, who was chief judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York until 2000, when he became a senior judge.
Other judges had ruled that Argentina owed the money, but those rulings were, in practice, unenforceable against a sovereign state. Judge Griesa came up with a legal interpretation to put teeth in the rulings. He held that Argentina must pay the old bonds in full at the same time it made the next semiannual interest payment to holders of the new bonds. And if it did not do so, any bank that helped Argentina pay interest on the new bonds would be violating the order.
That ruling was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and in June the Supreme Court refused to hear Argentina’s final appeal.
In Argentina’s debt restructuring, holders of the old bonds who accepted the country’s offer received a variety of new bonds depending to some extent on which old bonds they held and to some extent on which new bonds they chose. Some of the exchange bonds were denominated in United States dollars, some in Argentine pesos, some in euros and some in Japanese yen. Some of them were subject to New York law, others to Argentine, English or Japanese law.
And that is where the complexities arose that Judge Griesa seems not to have understood.
The order he issued earlier this year said that — assuming Argentina does not make good on the old bonds — it should not make interest payments on the exchange bonds, and banks should not help it do so. That sounded as if it covered all the exchange bonds, even those not issued under New York law.
But the opinion explaining the order discussed only the dollar bonds issued under New York law. It ignored the existence of other exchange bonds.
So did the ruling apply to those other exchange bonds, including those issued under Argentine law? Would a bank that processed interest payments on those bonds be in trouble with the judge?
Citibank’s Argentine branch, which is the trustee for bonds issued under Argentine law, some denominated in pesos and some in dollars, asked the judge for a clarification, and on June 27 he provided one. Citibank could process interest payments on those bonds. They were not covered by his order.
This week’s hearing was largely about changing that ruling, and the judge initially made it clear that he saw no reason for a change. He saw the bonds as domestic ones, owned by Argentine citizens. “From a practical, common-sense standpoint,” he asked a lawyer for the hedge funds who was trying to have the order modified, “why do they have to get dragged into this?”
It turned out that he did not know much about those Argentine-law bonds. He said his June order provided “a rather minute exception” to his original ruling, and told the hedge funds’ lawyer, Edward A. Friedman of Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman, “It is my understanding that the bonds being talked about in your motion are not part of the exchange.”
Told that the bonds in question were exchange bonds, and that they accounted for nearly a quarter of all the exchange bonds, he said he had not realized that and reversed course.
“Sitting here right now,” he said, “it strikes me that, being exchange bonds, they should be treated as exchange bonds and that they should be included with the other exchange bonds in the Feb. 23 order.”
It was not bad theater, but it hardly inspired confidence in the American legal system.
“These questions are essential to the operation of this injunction,” Anna Gelpern, a law professor at Georgetown University who has followed the case for years, said after reading the transcript of Tuesday’s hearing. “Up to half the debt could be in or out depending on how these questions are resolved. The fact we are confronting them, days before a payment default, is scary.”
It is not as if no one had pointed out the issues in the many legal briefs and arguments filed in this case, both before Judge Griesa and before appeals courts. But those arguments seem not to have registered. “For this to come out after this has gone through so much legal process, in the most sophisticated financial jurisdiction in America,” Ms. Gelpern said, “has to be astounding.”
On Tuesday, Judge Griesa eventually decided he would think it over and rule at a later date. At some point he will also have to deal with the status of bonds issued under English or Japanese law.
If he ends up ruling that the Argentine-law bonds are covered by his original ruling, and tells Citibank not to process the interest payment, then Citibank could have to decide whether to defy him or ignore the law in Argentina, where it could face prosecution.
Continue reading the main story — new exchange, with Argentine-law bonds given to any investors who want to give up their bonds issued under United States law. The judge would probably try to block such an exchange.
A grace period gives Argentina until Wednesday to pay the interest it owes on the exchange bonds. It has paid the money to the bank trustees, including Bank of New York Mellon for the New York-law bonds. That bank has done nothing with the money because it is clearly bound by the judge’s order.
Argentina says that payment means it will not default, because it will not be the country’s fault if the exchange bond holders are not paid. The judge says Argentina acted illegally in making the payment, but he has not decided what the Bank of New York Mellon should do now. The hedge funds want the judge to order the bank to return the money to Argentina. The bank, fearing suits from bondholders, wants to keep the money until all this is sorted out. The judge is also pondering that issue.
As Wednesday approaches, the judge has a lot to think about. It would be better if he had done some of that thinking before he issued his order, or if the appeals court or the Supreme Court had forced him to do so.
5. ARGENTINA HAS SHOWN IT IS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE (Financial Times)
July 25, 2014
From Mr Axel Kicillof
Sir, Contrary to Nicola Stock’s assertions (Letters, July 17), Argentina reached an agreement for a voluntary debt exchange with 92.4 per cent of its creditors after conducting lengthy and good faith negotiations under the principles of inter-creditor equity and effective payment capacity.
Argentina held several meetings during 2003 and 2004 with various creditor groups, including the Global Committee of Argentine Bondholders (GCAB), of which Task Force Argentina (TFA) was a member. In fact, 21 groups were invited to additional meetings in Buenos Aires in March 2004. Dialogue continued throughout the process, including in the run-up to the 2010 exchange.
TFA denies this process. TFA also denies that most of GCAB members that held bonds did participate in the debt restructurings of 2005 and 2010.
The retail bondholders Mr Stock claims to represent “purchased” (a euphemism) such bonds due to a concerted effort (a true cartelisation) of certain Italian banks to unload their holdings of Argentine bonds into the hands of its retail customers prior to the 2001 default. Mr Stock fails to disclose the real reason why unsophisticated retail bondholders held such risky instruments.
As it usually does, the financial sector transferred the risk to the most vulnerable participants.
Despite this fact, not only did Argentina not ignore retail bondholders during the restructuring, but offered them preferential access to the par bonds (more suited to their retail character). In fact, the vast majority of Italian retail bondholders joined Argentina’s debt exchanges and belong to the above mentioned 92.4 per cent.
Argentina has effectively demonstrated its willingness to negotiate, as recent Paris Club and Repsol agreements evidence, and reaffirms its commitment to finding a solution on fair, equitable, legal and sustainable conditions for 100 per cent of the bondholders.
Axel Kicillof, Minister of Economy and Public Finance, Argentina
6. ARGENTINA REFUSES DIRECT TALKS WITH HOLDOUT BONDHOLDERS (Bloomberg News)
By Daniel Cancel
July 24, 2014
Argentina refused to hold face-to-face negotiations with holdout creditors yesterday to avert a possible default on July 30, court-appointed mediator Daniel Pollack said.
Argentine government officials and representatives from holdout creditors including Elliott Management Corp. will return to Pollack’s office today at 10 a.m. in New York for another meeting. While today will be the fourth set of talks with the mediator this month, the two sides haven’t gotten any closer to a settlement, Pollack said.
“After speaking with both sides, separately, I proposed and urged direct, face-to-face talks between the parties,” Pollack said in a statement. “The representatives of the bondholders were agreeable to direct talks. The representatives of the Republic declined to engage in direct talks.”
U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Griesa, who ruled in favor of defaulted bondholders, ordered “continuous” talks ahead of next week’s deadline, when a 30-day grace period for an Argentine debt payment expires. Griesa said the country must pay the group of holdouts $1.5 billion if it makes any more payments on restructured debt.
Argentina’s delegation called for the court to create a financial instrument to safeguard against risks related to a clause that would require the nation to offer any terms reached with holdout creditors to owners of restructured notes. If no such instrument is created, a stay would be the best option, the nation’s economy ministry said in an e-mailed statement.
Blocked Payment
Argentina deposited $539 million with a trustee bank last month to cover payments to holders of restructured bonds, without also earmarking money for the holdouts, prompting Griesa to block any disbursements.
Yesterday, Argentine bonds rallied the most in emerging markets on speculation that the holdouts will ask Griesa for a delay of his ruling until Dec. 31. That’s the expiration date of a bond clause prohibiting Argentina from sweetening terms for the holdouts without giving a similar offer to investors who complied with the country’s earlier efforts to restructure its debt. Argentina defaulted on $95 billion of debt in 2001.
‘Engage Argentina’
Violating the so-called RUFO clause could expose the country to claims of as much as $500 billion, according to Argentina. The nation will keep meeting its obligations and won’t fall into default, President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner said July 23.
The government’s benchmark 2033 bonds, whose payment was blocked by Griesa, rose 2.2 cents yesterday to 88.46 cents on the dollar, pushing down the yield by 0.32 percentage point to 9.79 percent.
The bond prices are holding up in the face of a possible default on speculation that Fernandez might be able to swap investors into local-law bonds outside of Griesa’s jurisdiction, and thus continue paying.
NML Capital Ltd., the Elliott unit involved in the case, said Argentine officials refused to negotiate any aspect of the dispute and instead stated that no solution was possible.
“We will continue to seek ways to engage Argentina in negotiations,” NML said in an e-mailed statement. “But there is currently a total lack of willingness on Argentina’s part to solve this problem.”
7. ARGENTINA’S DEBT SAGA: UNSETTLING TIMES (The Economist)
July 26, 2014
The clock is ticking toward an Argentine default
ITS steakhouses bustle, its shopping malls teem. There are few signs that, on July 30th, Argentina could default for the eighth time. Yet the chances are rising.
The countdown started on June 16th, when the Supreme Court of the United States announced that it would not get involved in Argentina’s battle with NML Capital, a hedge fund that picked up cheap debt after Argentina’s 2001 default and has since litigated for payment of full principal plus interest. The decision left intact a ruling by Thomas Griesa, a New York district-court judge, which banned Argentina from paying the creditors who in 2005 and 2010 swapped 93% of defaulted debt for performing securities, if the country did not also pay NML what it wants.
Argentina was left with only thorny choices: pay NML the $1.3 billion plus interest awarded by Judge Griesa; negotiate a settlement with the hedge fund; or stop paying the exchange bondholders. A payment due on June 30th to those exchange bondholders was missed. The grace period expires on July 30th, at which point Argentina will again be in default.
Full payment would be hard to swallow. President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has always opposed stumping up, and a generous payment for NML would open the door to similar payouts to other “holdout” creditors. The consensus has been that Argentina would reach a negotiated settlement with the holdouts. Argentina had made good progress this year in its quest to regain access to capital markets—settling disputes with the Paris Club of government creditors, for example. Tackling the holdout issue was the logical next step. The price of dollar-denominated defaulted debt surged above face value after the Supreme Court’s ruling, opening up a gap with euro-denominated debt that is not subject to New York law (see chart).
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Yet the weeks have since been frittered away. Argentina’s principal tactic has been to try to win a stay from Judge Griesa. It claims it cannot arrange a settlement with the holdouts without potentially triggering the Rights Upon Future Offers (RUFO) clause written into its restructured bonds. This clause, which expires on December 31st, specifies that Argentina cannot voluntarily offer holdouts a better deal than it did during its 2005 and 2010 restructurings without extending the offer to all bondholders. Argentina has argued that violating this clause would risk a flood of bondholder claims and could leave officials vulnerable to criminal prosecution for increasing its debt. A stay until the expiry of the RUFO clause is the answer, it says.
NML insists Argentina is overegging the RUFO worry: given that the country has appealed its case all the way up to the Supreme Court and been rebuffed, a judge is unlikely to deem any deal “voluntary”. More importantly, Judge Griesa is having none of it. In a July 22nd hearing, he rejected the request for a stay and ordered the holdouts and Argentina to negotiate “continuously” with a court-appointed mediator in order to reach a deal. “The reference to the restrictions of the RUFO clause does not help because that clause was self-imposed by Argentina and therefore hard to use as an argument,” says Eugenio Bruno, a debt-restructuring lawyer.
A settlement would be in the interest of exchange bondholders, who would keep getting paid. It would also clearly suit the holdouts. Default would deprive NML of both a payout and its status as a disadvantaged creditor: unless Argentina is paying other bondholders and not paying NML, its claim for equal treatment is void. The fund’s representatives have stated they are willing to bend on timing as well as payment structure, offering to accept a mix of bonds and cash to lower the hit to Argentina’s foreign reserves. Workarounds for the RUFO problem may also be possible. Argentina could ask its exchange bondholders to waive the clause, though time is now short to secure the majority consent that is required. Some think Argentina could give NML promissory notes which it could exchange for performing securities in 2015, after the RUFO term expires. Failing that, the country could just pay NML the full amount, as ordered, which would be more likely to be deemed involuntary.
The unknown is how desperate Argentina is to avoid default. The country has survived 13 years without access to dollar-bond markets. It may calculate that its efforts to keep paying the exchange bondholders, allied to general suspicion of the holdouts, will stand it in good stead with mainstream creditors. Ms Fernández has worked hard to convince Argentines that Judge Griesa and the “vulture” funds would be to blame if the country defaults.
The costs for the outside world would be containable. Few investors would be shocked if Argentina defaults. Its outstanding debt under foreign law—what analysts call the “defaultable universe”—amounts to only $29 billion, far less than the $81 billion it reneged on in 2001.
On the other hand default would have real costs for Argentina. Its isolation from dollar-bond markets would continue. Its foreign-exchange reserves have dwindled over time. Borrowers such as YPF, the state oil firm that has placed bonds in global markets, would face higher interest rates—risking delays to the development of Vaca Muerta, a huge shale formation. Rising local demand for dollars is already putting pressure on the peso in the unofficial market. All of which would make it even harder for the country to crawl out of recession.
Default would also mean another foray into the legal labyrinth, by triggering “acceleration clauses” that give bondholders the right to demand immediate repayment. These clauses exist in all of the country’s foreign-law bonds, not just the ones governed by New York law, opening Argentina up to court battles in other jurisdictions, too. Easy answers there are none.
8. ARGENTINA DEFAULT BETS SURGE AS SINGER SETTLEMENT DEADLINE LOOMS (Bloomberg News)
By Daniel Cancel and Camila Russo
July 24, 2014
Traders are ratcheting up the odds Argentina will default as the government signals it would rather flout a U.S. court ruling than open itself to claims it says may swell to as much as $500 billion.
The country’s credit-default swaps due in three months now imply a 44 percent likelihood that debt payments will be suspended, the highest in the world and up from 28 percent a week ago, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
Argentina has until July 30 to comply with a ruling requiring it to pay creditors led by billionaire Paul Singer, who spurned debt exchanges following its 2001 default. The presiding judge blocked payments on the restructured bonds June 30 and rejected requests for a stay this week. Argentina quadrupled its estimate of potential claims this week, citing the risk of violating a bond clause prohibiting it from giving the holdouts better terms than those in prior restructurings.
“The set of events is pointing to an increase of a probability of default,” Donato Guarino, a strategist at Barclays Plc, said by phone from New York. “We’re at the end of the ride and it’s pretty much in Argentina’s part of the court.”
President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner said today in a televised speech from Buenos Aires province that she won’t sign a deal that compromises the country’s future.
‘Continuous’ Talks
Mediated talks between Argentina and the holdouts were delayed yesterday until today after the government delegation traveling from Buenos Aires said it wouldn’t arrive on time.
U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Griesa on July 22 had ordered Argentina to start “continuous” talks with the creditors. He said the nation doesn’t need a stay on his orders to pay the $1.5 billion owed to the holdouts.
Argentina had asked the 83-year-old judge to delay the ruling until after Dec. 31, when the Rights Upon Future Offers clause in the restructured bonds expires, so it can continue paying debt while it negotiates with holdouts. The country, which has $29.7 billion of foreign reserves, had said previously that the cost of claims from restructured bondholders demanding the same terms would be $120 billion.
“It’s increasingly looking like they’ll go down the technical default route until next year when the RUFO clause goes away,” Ray Zucaro, who helps manage $390 million of emerging market at SW Asset Management LLC, said by phone from Newport Beach, California. “It looks like a 70 percent chance of default.”
Credit Swaps
Zucaro said he sold his holdings of Argentine government bonds in June because investors have overestimated the chances of a settlement with creditors including Singer’s Elliott Management Corp.
Argentina’s benchmark notes due in 2033 have dropped 6.2 cents from a three-year high on July 11 to 86.3 cents on the dollar, data compiled by Bloomberg show. The bond prices have held up because investors foresee a high recovery value in the case of a default, according to Zucaro.
The upfront cost to buy protection against a default for three months with credit swaps has more than doubled in the past week to $3 million on $10 million of debt, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The net notional outstanding of Argentine credit-default swaps has surged 32 percent to $1 billion from $756 million on April 11, data compiled by Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation show.
TV Appearance
Tim Samples, a professor of legal studies at the University of Georgia, said Argentina may be overestimating the cost of violating the RUFO clause as a negotiating tactic.
“It seems exaggerated that a default is a better scenario than dealing with RUFO liabilities,” he said.
Fernandez seems to have decided not to pay the holdouts, Grupo BTG Pactual said in a report yesterday.
In her televised statement tonight, the president said that Argentine officials could face lawsuits if the RUFO clause is violated. Such an occurrence would destroy the country’s previous debt restructuring, she said.
“It is not that much that they are myopic about the consequences of default,” Andres Borenstein and Alex Muller-Jiskra, analysts at BTG, wrote in the report. “Rather it is fear of the legal consequences of the RUFO clause. The government wants to be 100 percent sure, and nobody could give that sort of assurance.”
9. ARGENTINA’S DOLLAR-ONLY MARKET FALLS ON CASH SCARCITY (Bloomberg News)
By Camila Russo
July 24, 2014
Gonzalo Demarchi’s two-bedroom house in Buenos Aires was on the market for 18 months before he was finally able to sell it, at a 25 percent discount.
That was partly because Demarchi, like most sellers, would only accept U.S. dollars as the Argentine peso weakens. It also was because the country’s mortgage market, which had been growing, is shrinking with interest rates at a five-year high, forcing most buyers to pay cash in hard-to-get dollars.
More than two years of restrictions on buying the U.S. currency are pushing down Argentina’s home prices for the first time since 2002. A weakening peso, with this year’s slide accelerating to 20 percent, is driving sellers like Demarchi to demand dollars. And with benchmark rates set at 28.9 percent to fight inflation at 37 percent, use of home loans has shriveled.
“The real estate market was so hugely impacted by currency controls because it’s priced in dollars and there’s no mortgage lending,” Jose Rozados, a director at research company Reporte Inmobiliario said in a telephone interview. “With inflation not slowing to a reasonable level anytime soon, and currency controls still in place, the situation will probably deteriorate.”
Home prices were 10 percent lower in dollar terms from a year earlier in May, according to Buenos Aires research company Reporte Inmobiliario. Only 4.4 percent of 24,408 property purchases in Argentina’s Buenos Aires province this year through May were made with mortgages, the smallest share in data going back to 1998.
Mortgage Share
Last year, 20 percent of home purchases were made with mortgages, up from 17 percent a year earlier. Homes bought with bank loans haven’t surpassed 21 percent of the total in the past 14 years.
Argentina’s three-month central bank note, the country’s benchmark lending rate, rose to 28.9 percent this year, the highest in the world, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Benchmark rates of similar maturities in Brazil, Mexico and the U.S. are 10.7 percent, 2.9 percent and 0.1 percent, respectively.
Government efforts to jumpstart the creation of an effective mortgage market have also been unsuccessful. It has been offering subsidized rates of 2 to 14 percent to finance new houses built on state lots. Still, the government doesn’t have enough funds to offer loans to the broader population, and the 79,333 mortgages awarded since the start of the project in June 2012, hasn’t been enough to revive the housing market.
Porsche Sales
Home prices are falling even as Argentines flock to assets perceived as safer than a peso-denominated bank account — appliances, cars, even bitcoins, a commodity promoted as a digital, or virtual, currency that isn’t subject to government control. Last year saw the biggest surge in demand in five years for foreign autos such as Porsche 911 Carrera S sports cars, sparking the government to clamp down on the purchases to stem an outflow of dollars.
Homebuyers are demanding more value for their dollars as the biggest economic contraction since 2008 and soaring inflation increase demand for hard currency. The government’s court battle with holdout bondholders denounced as “vultures” is threatening to lead to Argentina’s second default since 2001.
In illegal street markets used to skirt currency controls, the Argentine peso has slipped to 12.5 per dollar, the weakest in six months. That’s 53 percent worse than the rate in the official market, which is controlled by the central bank.
President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, who in July 2012 banned most dollar purchases outright after tightening controls in October 2011, this year authorized Argentines to buy foreign currency worth 20 percent of their average monthly salaries, with a limit of $2,000 per month.
No Choice
Dollars are still tight and many sellers can’t wait until currency controls ease further to get out, according to Florencia Cecchini, a real estate broker at Re/max Holdings Inc. (RMAX) in Buenos Aires.
“Prices had refused to budge for a while, even as sales fell, but now owners are seeing they have no choice,” Cecchini said in an interview.
Prices will fall as much as 30 percent in the next three years before rebounding, Cecchini said, citing Re/max estimates.
The average price per square meter of a two-bedroom apartment in Buenos Aires fell 10 percent to $1,693 in May, from $1,887 a year earlier, according to Reporte Inmobiliario. By comparison, prices rose 26 percent in dollar terms in Sao Paulo and 8.2 percent in Santiago.
Widening Gap
At current mortgage rates, borrowers would have to pay about 7,000 pesos per month on a loan to buy a $100,000 apartment, said Roberto Arevalo, director at Argentina’s Real Estate Chamber. The average monthly salary in Argentina is about 8,400 pesos ($1,028 at the official dollar rate).
“There’s a widening gap between the dollar price for properties and salaries in pesos,” Arevalo said. “If you add that to virtually no mortgage lending, it means the dream of owning a home remains just that for most people, a dream.”
Mortgages represented 9 percent of Argentine banks’ total lending in June, according to the country’s central bank.
Demarchi, the home seller, bought the house in 1989, at a time when prices were lower in dollar terms as a result of hyperinflation of 1,300 percent in Argentina. With the money he obtained from the house, he’ll buy a smaller property, on which he also expects to get at a reduced price.
“I would’ve never accepted an offer in pesos,” says Demarchi, a 60-year old real estate broker. “In this context of fast inflation, the dollar is the safest currency.”
10. MORE ARGENTINA BONDHOLDERS SEEK ORDER FORCING PAYMENT (Bloomberg News)
By Bob Van Voris
July 24, 2014
Holders of about $700 million of defaulted Argentine bonds asked a court to force the South American nation to make good on its obligations to them at the same time it pays holders of its restructured debt.
The bondholders, who are plaintiffs in eight class actions against Argentina, are seeking a court order similar to one granted to holders of more than $1.5 billion in defaulted Argentine bonds, led by Paul Singer’s NML Capital and Aurelius Capital Management LP. That ruling requires they be paid whenever the nation makes a payment on its restructured debt.
The investors today filed papers in Manhattan federal court asking U.S. District Judge Thomas P. Griesa to order Argentina to make payments into escrow accounts on behalf of the investors represented in those suits. Because the nation is appealing orders defining who is included in the investors classes, the scope of the claims isn’t clear.
Carmine Boccuzzi, a lawyer for Argentina, didn’t immediately return an e-mail seeking comment on the court filing.
The request came as Argentina faces a possible July 30 default if it fails to reach an agreement with the NML group that would permit it to make a required interest payment on its restructured bonds. Argentina claims it faces as much as $20 billion in claims it can’t pay from holders of defaulted bonds.
The investors’ request is based on a clause in the bond agreements known as pari passu, which Griesa has ruled requires Argentina to give equal treatment to holders of its defaulted bonds and holders of debt issued in two restructurings, in 2005 and 2010. About 93 percent of Argentina’s creditors agreed to exchange their bonds for ones paying about 30 percent of what they were originally promised.
‘Same Footing’
“The plaintiff classes here should stand on the same footing as the NML and other plaintiffs for whom pari passu injunctions have been granted,” the class plaintiffs said in the court filing.
In a hearing June 27, Griesa denied a request by “me too” bondholders in five cases for orders similar to the one in the NML case.
“NML and Aurelius are not the only parties who may have rights under the pari passu clause,” Griesa said in the hearing. “But at this point, in order to have some sensible organization of settlement discussions and so forth, it seems to me that it is not a good thing for me to start signing additional orders.”
The case is Seijas v. Republic of Argentina, 14-01444, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).
11. ARGENTINE DOLLAR BONDS RALLY ON SPECULATION RULING TO BE DELAYED (Bloomberg News)
By Camila Russo and Daniel Cancel
July 24, 2014
Argentine dollar bonds led gains in emerging markets after newspaper La Nacion reported holdout creditors will request an emergency stay on a U.S. court ruling before a July 30 deadline to continue settlement talks.
Government bonds due in 2033, whose interest payment was blocked by courts last month, rallied 2.25 cents to 88.51 cents on the dollar at 5 p.m. in Buenos Aires. Argentine bonds pared earlier gains after Aurelius Capital Management LP, which sued for better terms alongside Elliott Management Corp., called the story “utter fiction” in an e-mailed statement.
La Nacion, citing unidentified government officials, said holdout creditors may ask U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Griesa to delay his decision ordering Argentina to pay investors on defaulted bonds in full when paying restructured debt. A suspension of the ruling would let Argentina stay current on its performing debt and potentially allow the nation and holdouts to continue talks until Dec. 31, when a bond clause expires prohibiting it from voluntarily offering better terms than its previous restructurings.
“Since people’s perception of default risk has been rising the last few days, if there is any kind of rabbit to be pulled out of the bag that says default can be avoided, the market’s going to take that very positively,” Stuart Culverhouse, the global head of research at Exotix Partners LLP, said in a telephone interview from London. “However credible or not the actual story is.”
Argentine Delegation
If Argentina doesn’t reach a deal or obtain a delay on the ruling, the nation will default on July 30. A delegation of Argentine officials led by Finance Secretary Pablo Lopez and Carmen Corrales, an attorney for the nation at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, had a three-hour meeting with court-appointed mediator Daniel Pollack in Manhattan today.
Neither Argentine officials nor Corrales answered questions from reporters gathered outside the building.
The extra yield investors demand to hold Argentine debt over U.S. Treasuries narrowed 0.24 percentage point to 6.31 percentage points, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s EMBIG Diversified index. The spread on emerging-market debt narrowed 0.06 percentage point on average.
Griesa rejected in a July 22 hearing Argentina’s petition for a stay, urging the parties to “continuously” negotiate to avoid a default. He said the nation doesn’t need a stay on his orders to reach an agreement.
“This matter could be resolved quickly if Argentina would join us in settlement discussions,” Elliott’s NML Capital Ltd. said in a statement after the hearing.
Argentina said in its latest filing that any deal violating the Rights Upon Future Offers clause will trigger claims of as much as $500 billion. Officials had earlier said claims from restructured bondholders demanding the same terms as holdouts would total $120 billion.
‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’
“This is a classic prisoner’s dilemma — all three parties want the same thing, but since they have very little trust of one another, you end up with an outcome that no one wants,” Patrick Esteruelas, an analyst at Emso Partners Ltd., said in a telephone interview from New York. “All three parties want to avoid a default, but due to lack of trust, you might end up with a default.”
The costs for the Argentine economy in the case of a default could be “substantial,” and there could also be consequences for future restructurings elsewhere, International Monetary Fund Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard said at a press conference in Mexico City today.
Argentina’s benchmark exchange bonds are trading at over 80 cents on the dollar even as a potential default looms next week. There’s a price buffer preventing notes from falling further on speculation President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner would swap investors into local law bonds to continue paying or find a way to settle with holdouts next year, according to Donato Guarino, a strategist at Barclays Plc.
‘New Term’
Fernandez said yesterday the nation can’t default because it deposited $539 million for the debt payment and continues to have a strong capacity to pay.
“Those who don’t pay go into default and Argentina paid,” Fernandez said in a nationwide broadcast. “They’re going to have to invent a new term that reflects that a debtor paid and someone blocked and didn’t allow that money to arrive.”
While bonds are rising, traders are betting there’s a greater chance Argentina will default next week. The country’s credit-default swaps due in three months imply a 41 percent likelihood that debt payments will be suspended, the highest in the world and up from 28 percent a week ago, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
“The set of events is pointing to an increase of a probability of default,” Guarino, the Barclays strategist, said by phone from New York. “We’re at the end of the ride, and it’s pretty much in Argentina’s part of the court.”
12. YPF SAYS 23,000-STRONG OIL WORKERS STRIKE COSTS $12 MILLION (Bloomberg News)
By Pablo Gonzalez
July 24, 2014
YPF SA said a one-day strike by 23,000 workers in the oil-and-gas-rich Neuquen basin in Argentina will cost the state-owned oil producer as much as $12 million. The workers are planning another strike next week that will be twice as long .
A 24-hour walkout that began yesterday at 8 p.m. local time may cut production by 160,000 barrels of oil and 6 million cubic meters of natural gas, Buenos Aires-based YPF said in an e-mailed statement today. The Neuquen basin is responsible for 40 percent of Argentina’s oil output and 56 percent of gas output, the company said.
Members of the union, which represents workers in Neuquen, Rio Negro and La Pampa, are striking as provincial governors and federal authorities discuss changes to the country’s 1967 hydrocarbons law. The outcome will determine how revenue from the Vaca Muerta formation, which holds the world’s fourth-biggest shale oil reserves and second-largest shale gas reserves, are distributed.
“YPF doesn’t understand the real reasons for the 24-hour strike,” the company said. “Argentina needs the effort of all the oil industry to become energy self-sufficient.”
The union said it’s planning a 48-hour strike for July 30 to July 31. Provinces want to keep the highest royalties at 23 percent while the federal government is seeking to reduce them to a 15 percent limit, in a bid to attract investors.
YPF Proposal?
Other proposed changes would bar Argentine provinces from granting concessions to provincial companies, according to a bill drafted by the federal government. Francisco Perez, governor of Mendoza province, said the proposal was written by YPF Chief Executive Officer Miguel Galuccio. YPF declined to comment on the governor’s statement.
YPF’s American depositary receipts, which represent one ordinary share, gained 2.9 percent to close at $37 in New York. The ADRs have climbed 12 percent this year.
The striking workers are employed by YPF, Chevron Corp. (CVX), Exxon Mobil Corp. (XOM), Royal Dutch Shell Plc (RDSA) and Petrobras Argentina SA. (PZE)
Neuquen Senator Guillermo Pereyra, a former YPF board member and president of the union, known as Sindicato de Petroleo & Gas Privado de Rio Negro, Neuquen & La Pampa, said workers would “stand to defend provincial interests.”
Governors’ Bill
The federal government “is extorting Neuquen province to impose a bill against the people’s interest,” Pereyra said yesterday in an e-mailed statement. The province is projected to lose 16 million pesos ($1.96 million) in royalties from the one-day strike, according to YPF.
Governors of Neuquen, Rio Negro, Jujuy, Chubut and Mendoza provinces will submit an alternative bill to the one drafted by the federal government next week, Mendoza’s Perez said. According to him, the main issue in discussion is the desire of YPF to eliminate the so-called carry system being used by provincially controlled companies to attract investments from companies in cash by ceding areas to exploit.
Since YPF uses the system in its joint venture with Chevron, “the provincial companies should also be allowed to do it,” Perez said.
13. HOLDOUT COULD ASK US JUDGE TO SUSPEND ARGENTINA DEBT RULING-LA NACION (Reuters News)
By Sarah Marsh and Alejandro Lifschitz
July 24 2014
BUENOS AIRES, July 24 (Reuters) – One of the hedge funds suing Argentina for full repayment of its defaulted sovereign debt could call on Thursday for a suspension of the U.S. court ruling pushing it towards default, an Argentine daily wrote citing unnamed official sources.
La Nacion wrote that Elliott Management’s NML Capital Ltd would likely ask U.S. District Judge Thomas Griesa to reinstate a stay on his ruling for Argentina to pay it and other holdouts who did not participate in its debt restructuring back in full.
Griesa has said Argentina may not make its next coupon payment without fulfilling his ruling. But Argentina says it cannot pay the holdouts until the expiry at year-end of a clause prohibiting it from offering them better terms than the investors who took part in the 2005 and 2010 debt swaps.
If Argentina does not make the coupon payment by a July 30 deadline, this will trigger a new default, just 12 years after the last one.
Lead holdout creditors NML and Aurelius were not immediately available for comment when contacted by Reuters.
La Nacion said lawyers for NML are preparing a written request for the stay to be extended until the end of the year when the so-called RUFO clause expires in exchange for a commitment from Argentina to negotiate with the holdouts from 2015.
NML wants Argentina to deposit some money into an escrow account to guarantee its commitment, the paper wrote.
La Nacion cited official sources as speculating that NML could present its request to Griesa on Thursday.
14. ARGENTINA DEBT DISPUTE MEDIATOR SETS FRIDAY MEETING AS TALKS STALL (Dow Jones Institutional News)
By Ken Parks and Taos Turner
24 July 2014
BUENOS AIRES—Representatives for Argentina and a small group of creditors are set to continue talks Friday after failing to settle a high stakes dispute in previous meetings with a court-appointed mediator, who warned that time is running out for the country to avoid defaulting on its debt.
The parties, who earlier on Thursday met separately with the mediator, Daniel Pollack, will meet at his office on Friday at 10 a.m. ET in New York.
Mr. Pollack urged the parties to meet directly with each other in face-to-face talks, but that didn’t happen.
“The representatives of the bondholders were agreeable to direct talks; the representatives of the Republic declined to engage in direct talks. The issues separating the parties remain unresolved at this time,” Mr. Pollack’s office said in a statement.
Hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp. affiliate NML Capital Ltd. and Aurelius Capital Management LP are suing Argentina to collect on debt it stopped paying 13 years ago.
U.S. District Judge Thomas Griesa has ordered Argentina and hedge funds to meet “continuously” with Mr. Pollack to reach a deal ahead of a July 30 deadline on a payment related to Argentina’s Discount bonds governed by New York law.
The judge blocked interest payments for $539 million due June 30 on those bonds after Argentina deposited the funds with the bond trustee, but ignored his order to also pay the hedge funds. Argentina has until Wednesday to get that money to bondholders or run the risk defaulting for a second time in 13 years.
A spokesman for NML Capital said Argentina has all but decided to default next week.
“Argentina again refused to negotiate any aspect of the dispute. Instead, its representatives simply stated that no solution was possible,” the NML spokesman said in a statement.
Argentina’s lawyers and government negotiators repeated their concerns that cutting a deal might trigger massive claims by other creditors. The hedge funds should provide financial guarantees that would protect Argentina from that risk or the judge should suspend his ruling so Argentina can pay its other bondholders while it negotiates, the Economy Ministry said in a statement.
Argentine stocks and bonds rose Thursday as investors hoped for a breakthrough in the long running dispute.
The benchmark Merval stock index closed 1.2% higher, led by gains in shares of state oil company YPF SA and banking concern Grupo Financiero Galicia SA. The 2033 discount bond, whose interest payments were blocked by a U.S. judge last month, rose 0.4%, to close at 1,230 pesos ($150).
“As we get closer to the [payment] deadline we are going to see even more volatility. Today the market started with a lot of optimism that diminished a bit during the session,” said Francisco Marra, a trader at Buenos Aires-based Bull Market Brokers.
Argentina’s battle with the hedge funds stems from its default on some $100 billion in debt in 2001. The country offered holders of the defaulted bonds new securities valued at about 33 cents on the dollar in 2005 and 2010. Between the two swaps, investors agreed to exchange almost 93% of defaulted bonds eligible for restructuring.
The hedge funds declined to accept the offer and instead sued for full repayment. Those so-called holdout creditors have won about $1.6 billion after years of litigation in U.S. courts.
Argentina has largely run out of legal options after the U.S. Supreme Court on June 16 declined to hear its appeal in the case, leaving in place Judge Griesa’s decision that Argentina has to pay the hedge funds when it pays investors who own its restructured bonds.
15. ARGENTINA IS NOW VERY CLOSE TO DEFAULT (CNN Wire)
By Charles Riley
25 July 2014
HONG KONG (CNNMoney) — The clock is ticking. Argentina will default in just a few days unless the country can find a way to satisfy creditors that are owed roughly $1.5 billion.
The country’s only remaining option appears to be negotiations — and a compromise. If a deal is not reached, the country could miss its next bond payment on July 30.
Argentina’s pickle is the result of a marathon legal battle with a small group of “holdout” creditors that have demanded full payment on bonds they picked up after the country’s last default in 2001.
Most of the country’s other bondholders agreed to debt restructurings, but the holdouts have waged a battle in court for full principal — plus interest.
The countdown to default started in earnest last month when a U.S. judge ruled that if Argentina doesn’t pay the holdouts, it can’t make any more payments to its restructured bondholders.
The government of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner is now playing a high-stakes game of chicken with the holdouts. The group says they’re open to a compromise that would allow Argentina to avoid yet another default.
Argentina is worried that a deal with the holdouts could trigger billions of dollars in additional claims. The country’s government also insists it doesn’t have enough time to reach a fair resolution.
So far, the two groups appear to be making very little progress in the court-mandated negotiations. A court mediator, Daniel Pollack, said Thursday that Argentina had declined to enter direct talks with the holdouts, which include several American hedge funds.
NML Capital, one of the holdout hedge funds, said in a statement that Argentina had shown a “total lack of willingness” to solve the problem.
“Argentina’s government made clear that it will be choosing to default next week,” NML said. “Argentina again refused to negotiate any aspect of the dispute. Instead, its representatives simply stated that no solution was possible.”
Fernández, who has long opposed paying the holdouts, has said she won’t accept any deal that threatens the country’s future.
Still, there are powerful incentives pushing both sides toward a compromise.
Argentina is struggling through a recession that would almost certainly be made worse by a default. Foreign investment could dry up, and the government might be forced to further devalue its currency.
For the holdouts, a default would remove any leverage they have over Argentina to secure full payment.
If a deal does materialize, it’s likely to happen at the last minute. Pollack said that he will be meeting with both parties in the coming days.
“The time for the Republic to avoid default is short,” he said Thursday.
16. U.S. SUPREME COURT’S RULING ON ARGENTINE DEBT HAS WORLDWIDE IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND DEBT RESTRUCTURING (Mondaq Business Briefing)
By Alan Feld
24 July 2014
The United States Supreme Court denied Argentina’s request for review of a Second Circuit court order that requires Argentina to pay nearly $1.4 billion by July 30 to certain holdout bondholders that did not participate in debt restructurings after Argentina’s 2001 sovereign debt default. The Court also issued a 7-1 decision that authorizes the debt holders to subpoena banks in an effort to trace Argentina’s assets and secure payment on their bonds. Together, these rulings effectively ended Argentina’s 13-year legal battle against these holdout creditors. These rulings have vast implications, not only for Argentina’s debt holders, but for investors and sovereigns worldwide.
In the underlying case, plaintiffs, comprised of hedge funds and other investors, sought to hold Argentina to the terms of its original bond offering, thus requiring Argentina to pay debt holders who had not participated in Argentina’s 2005 or 2010 debt restructuring plans in full. Many of the plaintiffs purchased Argentina’s sovereign bonds at a steep discount and, thus, seek to make a substantial profit as a result of the ruling. In contrast, the 93% of debt holders who accepted the restructuring plans are entitled to only 30 cents on the dollar. The Second Circuit held that the non-participating debt holders were entitled to full payment, but issued a stay of the order to allow Argentina to seek review by the U.S. Supreme Court. Although several countries, including France, Mexico and Brazil, filed amici briefs in support of Argentina, the Court, without explanation, declined to hear the case. Plaintiffs have now requested that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals immediately dissolve the stay and allow plaintiffs to seek payment from Argentina.
Now, both the bondholders and the world anxiously await Argentina’s next move. It is unlikely that Argentina will pay the full amount owed. Doing so would likely cause the debt holders who accepted Argentina’s prior restructuring plans to demand full payment of their claims, which could top $15 billion, causing the country to default again. Similarly, a refusal to make any payments – under the current court order in place — would effectively prevent Argentina from making current debt service payments to holders of performing bonds for which there has not been any default. A resulting default to current bondholders would be extremely damaging to Argentina and likely hinder future foreign investment and severely damage creditors’ and banks’ trust in the country. Most likely, Argentina will have to negotiate payments to plaintiffs, either for less than the full amount owed or structured over time.
On Tuesday, July 22, the U.S. District Court ordered the parties to meet with a special mediator in an attempt to reach an agreement before the July 30 debt service payment deadline for the next regularly scheduled payment under the performing restructured bonds. The court has refused to grant Argentina’s request for a stay in the dispute until 2015, when the rights upon future offerings (“RUFO”) clause in the exchange bonds expire, which allows the debt holders who accepted Argentina’s prior restructuring plans to demand the same payment terms Argentina reaches with the holdout debt holders.
This decision changes the rules on sovereign debt restructuring in 3 important ways. First, it confirms the enforceability of sovereign debt. The court’s ruling makes clear that sovereign debtors cannot be excused from the terms of their original contractual obligations. Second, debt restructuring may become more difficult for sovereign nations in financial distress by limiting sovereigns’ ability to restructure debt over the objections of non-consenting bondholders and decreasing investors’ incentive to accept reduced and restructured payments. Third, by granting the holdout bondholders the power to subpoena information from banks concerning a sovereign’s assets, the court’s ruling brings transparency to government transactions that may have previously been hidden.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
17. STATEMENT OF DANIEL A. POLLACK, SPECIAL MASTER IN ARGENTINA DEBT LITIGATION (PR Newswire)
24 July 2014
Daniel A. Pollack, the Special Master appointed by Judge Thomas P. Griesa to conduct and preside over settlement negotiations between the Republic of Argentina and its Bondholders, issued the following statement today:
“Representatives of the Republic of Argentina and their lawyers met with me today. Representatives of the Bondholders and their lawyers also met with me today. After speaking with both sides, separately, I proposed and urged direct, face-to-face talks between the parties. The representatives of the Bondholders were agreeable to direct talks; the representatives of the Republic declined to engage in direct talks. The issues separating the parties remain unresolved at this time. The time for the Republic to avoid Default (July 30) is short. Accordingly, it is my expectation that, consistent with Judge Griesa’s direction in open Court earlier this week, there will be further meetings with the parties over the next several days.”
Mr. Pollack said that he would have no further public comment at this time.
 
Diplomacy is seduction in another guise, Mr. Adams. One improves with practice.
~ Benjamin Franklin – the Father of the American Diplomacy, who did not “pay to play” for his diplomatic jobs overseas, but was send due to his skills and experience. 

LEGALIZED THEFT by Steve H. HANKE

27 julio, 2014

ARGENTINA SALVAJIZADA

Legalized Theft: Argentina’s Rulers Cannot Resurrect an Economy By Ignoring the Rule of Law and Plundering Private Property

by Steve H. Hanke

Steve H. Hanke is a professor of applied economics at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland; chairman of the Friedberg Mercantile Group of New York; and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute.

Added to cato.org on March 4, 2002

This article first appeared in Forbes Magazine on March 4, 2002.

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The mess in Buenos Aires is nothing short of criminal. Citizens are rioting. The government is blocking depositors from tapping their bank accounts. Commercial banks have been forced to turn over dollars to the central bank. People are trying to sneak greenbacks out of the country.

When President Eduardo Duhalde ended the decade-old currency system, in which the peso and dollar both legally…

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CRÉDITOS HIPOTECARIOS IMPOSIBLES K

27 julio, 2014

ARGENTINA SALVAJIZADA

Intenta engañarse a la opinión publica desde http://opinion.infobae.com/carlos-heller/2013/08/01/dos-modelos-de-credito-y-de-pais/ al comparar un imposible crédito masivo hipotecario cristinista con otro imposible idem del gobierno Macrista. Ambos proyectos son mentirosos y están destinados a propaganda electoral, y no a solucionar la falta de viviendas.

Para que un crédito a 30 años sea repagable, es preciso subdividir la amortización en 360 cuotas del mismo valor en terminos de poder adquisitivo constante. Esto era fácil cuando el capital constante se medía con el oro, el franco suizo, la libra esterlina o el dólar norteamericano. Todos ellos valores constantes, que median capital en forma suficiente para que acreedores y deudores estuviesen conformes: el banco otorgante del crédito y los tomadores del préstamo, que idealmente no debía superar un 70 % del costo real del inmueble a adquirir. Eso implica que la tasa de interés medida sobre capital constante estable no supere la Libor mas 2 %…

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CAVALLO re Kirchners y Buitres

27 julio, 2014
Domingo Cavallo

Para 
Hoy a las 10:09 AM

Domingo Cavallo


Traten de no alimentar más buitres

Posted: 26 Jul 2014 05:06 PM PDT

Por Domingo Cavallo, para Perfil

Los buitres van a realizar ganancias importantes a costa de la Argentina porque el gobierno de Néstor Kirchner en 2005 llevo a cabo una muy mala restructuración de la deuda pública. Se engolosinó con una supuesta quita, que por otro lado no fue muy importante porque terminaron pagando los denominados cupones de PBI, pero le dejaron el terreno preparado a los fondos buitres para que llevaran a cabo su tradicional estrategia de litigar en los tribunales de Nueva York y terminar cobrando, no sólo el monto de la deuda original, sino todos los intereses, más punitorios y costas.

En lugar de haber planteado cláusulas de salida consentida que hubieran quitado a quienes no se presentaban al canje la posibilidad de litigar en Nueva York, algo que era bien conocido y que en 2001, cuando estábamos preparando la reestructuración ordenada de la deuda teníamos muy en claro, sancionaron la denominada ley cerrojo y concedieron las clausulas RUFO. Si los asesores letrados del exterior y de los órganos argentinos intervinientes  no alertaron al Ministro de Economía y al Secretario de Finanzas del enorme riesgo que estaban asumiendo, deberían ser demandados por mala praxis profesional. Si les advirtieron del riesgo y las autoridades argentinas lo asumieron a sabiendas de lo que significaba, se trató de un grave error político.

Pero ahora no es momento de llorar sobre la leche derramada. Lo que el gobierno debe hacer es evitar que se cree el caldo de cultivo para más buitres. Los buitres necesitan del default y del desorden de las economías. Por eso yo los denuncié en noviembre de 2001 cuando hacían todo lo posible para que Argentina no terminara la reestructuración ordenada de la deuda que había comenzado el  1 de noviembre de aquel año. Lamentablemente, la pesificación, la devaluación extrema y el default generalizado crearon el ambiente que los buitres deseaban para llevar a cabo su estrategia.

Lo que hay que hacer ahora es cumplir con la sentencia del juicio que nos ganaron para evitar que se sucedan juicios adicionales que pueden terminar multiplicando las pérdidas para el país.  Las consecuencias que podría acarrear la aplicación de la cláusula RUFO han sido magnificadas por la interpretación (muy poco razonable) que el propio gobierno argentino ha hecho y que puede ser utilizada en contra de nuestros intereses. Ahora lo único que queda es ofrecer las garantías que sean necesarias de que Argentina va a cumplir con las sentencias judiciales definitivas a partir de enero, de tal forma que el Juez Griesa esté dispuesto a extender hasta enero la suspensión de la ejecución de la sentencia.

Si en lugar de lograr esa decisión de Griesa, el gobierno Argentino deja que se opere el default de la deuda el 30 de julio, se enfrentará un riesgo de aceleración de la deuda reestructurada que es mucho más peligrosa que la propia cláusula RUFO. En ese clima de desorden y falta de respeto a las decisiones judiciales, lo único que se estará logrando es que los buitres se multipliquen y cuenten con más y mejores armas para seguir luchando en contra del interés de todos los argentinos.  Y mientras tanto Argentina tendrá que seguir financiándose con enormes tasas de interés como las que paga por las LEBACs o como las que rinden los bonos que el gobierno coloca a través de la ANSES.

Ojalá el gobierno de Cristina Kirchner no actúe en los próximos días con el grado de irresponsabilidad con que lo hizo en 2005 cuando llevó a cabo la reestructuración de la deuda con absoluta falta de profesionalidad y pésimo asesoramiento.

   
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suscribir al Blog de Cavallo: explica Diciembre de 2001

26 julio, 2014
Domingo Cavallo

Para 
Hoy a las 10:03 AM

Domingo Cavallo


Un muy buen reportaje que me hicieron dos periodistas de Ambito Financiero

Posted: 25 Jul 2014 10:38 AM PDT

Después de tres horas de conversación con dos periodistas de Ámbito Financiero y The Buenos Aires Herald, tube dudas sobre cómo resumirían un reportaje tan largo. Pero debo reconocer que, salvo el título, que seguramente no fue elegido por ellos, el contenido del reportaje resume muy bien lo que yo les dije. Como homenaje a la calidad de la labor de Sebastián Lacunza y Fermín Koop, deseo hacer llegar su contenido a los seguidores de este blog.

   
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Cristina ¿prefiere el default?

25 julio, 2014

La gente normal prefiere cumplir con sus compromisos, supongo. Porque incumplirlos incomoda al que prometió el pago. Pero hay gente distinta, que ama pedir prestado y no pagar. No me refiero solo a los bandidos comunes, sino a otros que se comportan como tales cuando son los Presidentes de países atrasados culturalmente, caso Argentina desde hace tiempo. Para estos últimos, el DEFAULT se aplaude, tal como aconteció cuando el congreso nacional argentino controlado por el peronismo aplaudió con felicidad cuando el presidente provisional Adolfo Rodriguez Saa tuvo – entristecido – que anunciar que Argentina estaba en DEFAULT con sus acreedores internacionales. Buscar video para comprobar mirando atentamente, la sorpresa de dicho Presidente cuando su anuncio al Congreso Nacional supuestamente penoso fué celebrado con júbilo atronador por los peronistas, sucedió en diciembre de 2001. Eso muestra el nivel cultural y político de los aplaudidores: parecen niños caprichosos, que consideran que pedir prestado lo ajeno es bueno, y devolverlo es malo. Por eso, como los yanquis son ricos, es mejor amigarse para recibir créditos y en cambio negarse a devolver el dinero, alegando que los acreedores son capitalistas usureros que hoy son llamados “Fondos Buitres” por el kirchnerismo, para intentar que la mayoría de los argentinos aplaudamos a los Kirchners, y odiemos a Wall Street y al sistema financiero internacional eficiente que tiene sede en Wall Street.
Hoy Cristina parece insistir en su estrategia: culpar al Juez Griesa para poder justificarse ella ante el fracaso de su gobierno, que dijo habernos desendeudado, pero nos engañó: consiguió amedrantar a los acreedores para conseguir quita y refinanciación de deuda publica, y lo logró en 2010. Pero una minoría insatisfecha decidió que Argentina debía cumplir obligaciones contraidas en el Estado de Nueva York, y logró que el Juez Griesa condenara dos años atrás a pagar el cien por ciento mas intereses y gastos del juicio. Esto es publico y notorio. Pero hoy Argentina aparentemente no puede pagar porque ha sido desgobernada – robada, dicen los medios- por Cristina, que dilapidó dinero publico para conseguir ser reelecta Presidenta por medio del derroche de dinero publico, tanto en nombrar empleados publicos innecesarios, como jubilando gente que no hecho aportes jubilatorios. Eso “benefició” a millones de personas, pero como los recursos salieron del Estado, fue un retroceso para la economía. Y como sucede con los paises desgobernados por bandidos populistas autoritarios, hubo que emitir dinero inflacionario, y hasta se urdió oscuramente la compra de una empresa que fabricaba billetes de banco, algo que hoy se conoce como el caso Ciccone, y que hace sospechar no solo del vice presidente Boudou, sino algo peor: que todo fue planeado originariamente por Nestor Kirchner, para que bajo testaferros, el kirchnerismo pudiese controlar la fabricación de billetes de banco en Argentina. ¿Porqué no fué el Estado quien expropiara inicialmente las maquinarias en poder de Ciccone que estaba en quiebra? Intentemos pensar mal, como Sherlock Holmes, para descubrir posibles delitos. Veamos:
Si un Presidente bandido es dueño – sin figurar como tal – de la impresora oficial de dinero nacional, enriquecerse personalmente le posible: basta con imprimir billetes de banco sin informar al Banco Central. Y esto se logra emitiendo billetes bancarios “gemelos”, es decir, dos con el mismo numero de serie. Y este operativo delictivo, implica que la plaza se “empapela” y la inflación asciende. Matemáticamente, parece imposible que una persona tenga en su mano dos billetes exactamente iguales de cien pesos argentinos y lo denuncie penalmente. El Poder absoluto puede duplicar el dinero de papel, para enriquecer a al núcleo ilícitamente asociado. No afirmo que ésto se haya hecho, pero pudo haberse hecho, ya que no hay motivos aparentes para ocultar el operativo que permitió que alguien del sector privado, cuyo nombre todavía no se conoce, haya logrado apropiarse de la empresa quebrada Ciccone, y logrado que el propio Estado Argentino decidiese expropiarla para que desaparecieran los rastros de un posible delito. Que solo tenía sentido cometerse desde el Estado, porque es imposible emitir dinero duplicado en una imprenta privada sin que el Banco Central se entere. Ergo, el Poder era el único capaz de cometer el delito, mediante un operativo donde intervienen necesariamente mas de tres personas, que se llama ASOCIACIÓN ILÍCITA y convierte a todos sus integrantes en solidarios criminales. Quizás el negocio era apenas imprimir mas billetes a costo elevado, y por eso Argentina sigue teniendo como máximo valor al billete de cien pesos, que hoy representa alrededor de ocho dolares, y transportarlo en grandes cantidades costoso: mover 8 millones de dolares en pesos como minimo requiere ocho millones de billetes de cien pesos, y si alguien los tuviese, notaría que resulta inconveniente no tener hoy billetes de a quinientos o mil pesos.

Delinquir desde el Poder es una traición a la Patria y corrupción estatal, algo muy grave, al punto que el Papa Francisco dijo que los curruptos (desde el estado, supongo) no tienen perdón, porque se trata de un delito permanente, donde el delincuente no tiene ganas de arrepentirse, y entonces no aparece el “propósito de enmienda” que la Iglesia Católica exige a quienes se declaran arrepentidos. Obviamente, ningún Presidente argentino se ha arrepentido jamas de sus delitos desde el Estado, por eso oficialmente no existen precedentes de condenas a Presidentes corruptos. Empero, Cristina está indignada contra el Juez Griesa, a pocos días de que entremos en default. Y actúa igual que los militares argentinos cuando se negaron a acatar el fallo del Tribunal Arbitral que decidió que las Islas Picton, Nueva y Lennox pertenecían a Chile, y eso motivó un problema internacional, que casi provocó que Argentina iniciara una guerra contra los hermanos transandinos. Intervino el Papa polaco, y logró calmar los animos enviando al Cardenal Samoré, quien intervino como “mediador” y terminó la payasada opinando que efectivamente las tres Islas eran de Chile. Pero dejó bien parados a los fascistas militares que nos dominaban diciendo que las aguas al sur de Argentina y Chile se dividían en sectores y algunos de ellos eran de Argentina y otros no. Pareció un “empate”, pero fue en realidad un fracaso de nuestros militares y de Argentina. O si lo preferimos, un triunfo claro de Chile, que consiguió que la Justicia le diera lo que era suyo, porque se lo había convenido el siglo anterior con Argentina.
Hoy, otro MEDIADOR ha sido designado por el Juez Griesa, que no puede meterse a analizar los planteos de Argentina Cristinista contra los Fondos buitres porque su labor terminó dos años atrás cuando dictó sentencia como Juez de Nueva York declarando que los Fondos Buitres tenían razón y debíamos Argentina pagarles el 100 por ciento, mas intereses y costas. Esto se vincula al conflicto con Chile, porque se muestra que cuando los argentinos rechazamos un fallo (arbitral, en el caso con Chile) o judicial (la Corte de Griesa en Nueva York) los Presidentes autoritarios argentinos aparentemente ganan prestigio, porque se produce la victimización: Argentina es perjudicada, y el gobierno defiende a nosotros, los oprimidos por el mundo externo, tanto en el caso del laudo arbitral a favor de Chile que los militares rechazaron, como cuando hoy Cristina públicamente desconoce la sentencia del Juez Griesa, y ha intentado que varios países tercermundistas apoyen la posición argentina. Y lo hacen incluso utilizando el Foro de las Naciones Unidas, que no fue creada para temas políticos internos de los paises normales que no son los CINCO grandes que tienen derecho al veto, y son los que inventaron a las Naciones Unidas para impedir la tercera guerra mundial, y lo lograron.
¿Porqué Cristina insiste en recurrir contra Griesa y los Fondos Buitres, si como abogada sabe que la sentencia está firme y el Juez no puede modificarla? Las malas lenguas dirán que no es abogada, y que si diploma es trucho, pero eso de nada sirve. Sospecho que lo hace por motivos ocultos. Para averiguarlo, pensemos mal, como si fuesemos detectives. Si los Kirchners hubiesen comprado millones de bonos aprovechando que ellos habían reabierto un segundo canje que se suponía no existiría, pueden beneficiarse de un nuevo default al no cumplir la sentencia de Griesa, que haría bajar el precio de los bonos argentinos en el mercado, al valor de hoy, 25 de julio de 2004.El pensar que Cristina lo hace porque le parece injusto que Argentina cumpla con sus obligaciones no sirve: si lo creyera hubiera ordenado investigar a la Justicia si existieron negociados en las emisiones de bonos y sus refinanciaciones, y como es la dueña de la Corte Suprema de Justicia Nacional porque Néstor nombró la mayoría de sus integrantes. Además, nombró a la Procuradora General de la Nación doctora Gils Carbó, la persona que impidió por siete meses que el digno Fiscal Campagnoli investigase a los amigos de Nestor Kirchner y las supuestas conexiones entre Kirchnerismo y mafias que se enriquecieron en forma proporcional al empobrecimiento de los argentinos.
De un gobierno capaz de alterar los “indices de precios” conocidos como INDEC cabe sospechar. Y una Presidenta que intenta que un Juez de Nueva York borre con el codo su sentencia de hace dos años para modificarla y beneficiar a Argentina postergando todo hasta 2015 para que la clausula RUFO deje de funcionar, también. Pero Griesa no puede hacerlo, aunque quisiera, porque la Constitución de los Estados Unidos no se lo permite,y supongo la del Estado de Nueva York tampoco. Por eso, el capitalismo serio y exitoso se asienta en Wall Street, Nueva York, USA, y no en Buenos Aires o en Kirchnerlandia.
Ojo: no entristecernos, Ella se va para siempre el 10 de diciembre de 2015, y razonablemente hasta entonces seguiremos siendo robados y desgobernados. Pero después está en nosotros elegir de Presidente al Estadista sopado, ese que he descripto en ¿Donde están los Estadistas?, publicado en 1998 y puede verse cliqueando en el margen derecho del blog. ARGENTINOS e IGNORANTES llevan las mismas letras, Ortega y Gasset lo decía. Pero no necesitamos cambiar el nombre de nuestra nación, podemos terminar con los gobernantes ladrones y volveremos a estar entre los países confiables y prósperos.